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Regulatory Competitive Shelters 
YANIV HELED* 
This Article identifies an array of seemingly disparate federal exclusivity 
regimes as belonging to an increasingly prevalent and relatively new class of 
highly valuable government benefits, which it names “regulatory competitive 
shelters” (RCSs). It characterizes RCSs and distinguishes them from other, 
more traditional kinds of government-instituted properties. The Article then 
proceeds to describe a particular brand of RCSs established in federal 
statutory frameworks whose aim—much like patents—is to create incentives 
for technological innovation. Identifying several common motifs of such RCS 
regimes, the Article offers a taxonomy of these RCSs and describes the 
mechanisms by which RCSs instituted under such regimes achieve their 
goals. Part III of this Article surveys—for the first time under a single title—
all of the RCS regimes instituted to date in federal law which are aimed at 
promoting technological innovation. The Article concludes with a discussion 
of several aspects of RCSs that require further inquiry and will be further 
discussed in later articles. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Since the late 1970s, a new class of administrative intellectual properties 
has been quietly, almost secretively, emerging to fill gaps and support 
technological innovation where patents have fallen short. Known as 
“regulatory exclusivities,” “data exclusivities,” “market exclusivities,” 
“pseudo-patent exclusivities,” etc.,1 these administrative benefits have 
received little attention in academic literature and remained, until recently, 
largely undertheorized. This Article, the first of three dedicated to these 
institutions, assembles, for the first time under a single title, these numerous 
administrative benefits. It offers a new name for them—regulatory competitive 
shelters (RCSs)—characterizes them, and describes them as an increasingly 
                                                                                                                     
 1 See infra Part II.D. 
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important class (rather than a disparate set) of regulatory institutions.2 As 
RCSs aimed at creating incentives for technological innovation3 have been 
growing increasingly popular in recent years, it is likely that more of these 
institutions will find their way to future legislation. If we are to use RCSs 
successfully, it is thus necessary to discuss RCSs not just in their own 
particular contexts, but rather in a broader context and as the widely accepted 
innovation policy tools that they have become.  
While the story of RCSs began in the 1970s, it was not until the 1980s that 
they gained notoriety. In 1983 and 1984, respectively, Congress passed the 
Orphan Drug Act (ODA)4 and the Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act (the Hatch-Waxman Act).5 Both Acts represented the 
culmination of intense efforts to revitalize pharmaceutical technology, and 
both were preceded by debates that would eventually shape health care as we 
know it. At the center of these debates was the balancing of two competing yet 
equally important public policy goals: On one hand, the goal of creating 
incentives for innovation in pharmaceuticals and production of socially 
valuable data; and on the other hand, the goal of increasing the public’s access 
to such drugs by facilitating the approval of more affordable, generic versions 
of such drugs. Eventually, a solution emerged that accommodated both 
interests and made it possible for the industry and consumers to reach a 
historic compromise. Central to that compromise was the institution of a novel 
benefit, which was to be administered by the Food and Drug Administration 
(FDA), and was separate from and independent of any patents covering the 
regulated pharmaceutical products.6 It did not manifest in a direct grant of any 
identifiable right by the regulating agency. Rather, the benefit mandated that 
the agency, having used its power to approve the marketing of a regulated 
product, will be unable, temporarily, to do so again for competing products, 
thereby effectively creating a shelter from competition—an exclusivity.  
                                                                                                                     
 2 The two other articles will be dedicated to a more in-depth discussion of policy 
issues surrounding RCSs in light of their intersection and interchangeability with patents, 
and to the international dissemination of RCSs, as a legal institution, through treaties and 
trade agreements.  
 3 This Article focuses on a specific brand of RCSs whose purpose is the creation of 
incentives for technological innovation. While it may be more accurate to denominate such 
RCSs as “innovation incentivizing RCSs” (or iiRCSs for short), for the sake of clarity and 
simplicity, this Article will consistently use the term “RCSs.” It is quite possible, however, 
that future discussion of RCSs in general and other brands of RCSs in particular would 
require a more elaborate terminology to enable distinguishing iiRCSs from other brands of 
RCSs that do not necessarily share the same purpose. 
 4 Orphan Drug Act, Pub. L. No. 97-414, 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended 
at 21 U.S.C. § 360aa–ee and scattered sections of 25, 35 and 42 U.S.C. (2012)) [hereinafter 
ODA]. 
 5 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (Hatch-Waxman 
Act), Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15, 
21, 35 and 42 U.S.C. (2012)).  
 6 See infra Part III.C.  
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Hence, for example, under the Hatch-Waxman Act, once the FDA has 
approved a drug product containing a new chemical compound, it is unable to 
approve other products containing the same compound for a period of five 
years.7 Similarly, under the ODA, after approving a drug product for the 
treatment of a certain “orphan condition,” the FDA is unable to approve 
another drug product treating the same condition for a period of seven years.8  
The grant of exclusive benefits by administrative agencies9 is not a new 
phenomenon. However, the benefits instituted under the ODA and Hatch-
Waxman Act were different from other kinds of benefits not only in design but 
also in purpose, which is primarily the creation of incentives for technological 
innovation.10 Both the ODA and Hatch-Waxman frameworks, including their 
RCSs, have been considered highly successful in achieving their respective 
goals.11 In light of these perceived successes as well as RCSs’ many 
                                                                                                                     
 7 See infra Part III.C. Notably, the Hatch-Waxman Act included additional RCSs as 
well as exceptions and limitations thereof. See id.  
 8 See infra Part II.B.  
 9 For purposes of the discussion in this Article, reference to administrative agencies 
includes any regulatory body in the federal, state and local levels.  
 10 Technological innovation is: 
both the development and application of a new product, process, or service. It assumes 
novelty in the device, the application, or both. Thus, innovation can include the use of 
an existing type of product in a new application or the development of a new device 
for an existing application. Innovation encompasses many activities, including 
scientific, technical, and market research; product, process, or service development; 
and manufacturing and marketing to the extent they support dissemination and 
application of the invention. 
U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, INNOVATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION OF 
EMERGING TECHNOLOGIES 2 (1995). Although the above definition of innovation includes 
the process of invention, which is frequently part of research and development (R&D) 
processes, innovation and invention should not be confused, whereas invention is: 
the act of devising or fabricating a novel device, process, or service. Invention 
describes the initial conception of a new product, process, or service, but not the act of 
putting it to use. Inventions can be protected by patents, though many inventions are 
not patented, and most patents are never exploited commercially. 
Id. 
 11 Ernst R. Berndt & Murray L. Aitken, Brand Loyalty, Generic Entry and Price 
Competition in Pharmaceuticals in the Quarter Century after the 1984 Waxman-Hatch 
Legislation, 18 INT’L J. ECON. BUS. 177, 198 (2011) (reporting Hatch-Waxman Act’s 
success in facilitating a thriving generic pharmaceuticals industry and market); Fredric J. 
Cohen, Macro Trends in Pharmaceutical Innovation, 4 NATURE REV. DRUG DISCOVERY 
78, 79 (2005) (citing the “changes in federal and local laws in the 1980s” as the reason for 
a competitive environment of “innovate or die”); Richard G. Frank, The Ongoing 
Regulation of Generic Drugs, 357 NEW ENG. J. MED. PERSPECTIVE 1993, 1993 (2007) 
(calling the Hatch-Waxman Act a “health policy success story” for its creation of “rules 
under which generic pharmaceutical products could compete with brand-name products”); 
Martha M. Rumore, The Hatch-Waxman Act—25 Years Later: Keeping the 
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advantages over other forms of exclusivity, RCSs acquired a reputation with 
policymakers and stakeholders as an effective method of structuring incentives 
in certain regulated markets.12 Thus, since the early 1980s, RCSs have become 
a popular form of exclusivity with stakeholders in such markets, and several 
additional RCS regimes were instituted with the similar purpose of spurring 
innovation in regulated areas of technology.13 Moreover, RCS regimes have 
been growing increasingly prevalent in congressional bills, international trade 
                                                                                                                     
Pharmaceutical Scales Balanced, PHARMACY TIMES (Aug. 15, 2009), 
http://www.pharmacytimes.com/publications/supplement/2009/GenericSupplement0809/G
eneric-HatchWaxman-0809, archived at http://perma.cc/2A7W-ZBXM (arguing that the 
Hatch-Waxman Act has “fulfilled its purposes” and that it “encourage[s] growth of the 
generic industry and provide[s] brand companies with incentives;” providing statistics in 
support of the argument that the Hatch-Waxman Act encourages patent challenges of brand 
name drugs, has increased generic prevalence in the pharmaceutical market, and has 
resulted in surprising investment in R&D by generic manufacturers); see also infra note 
156 and accompanying text. But see CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW INCREASED 
COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND RETURNS IN THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY xiii (1998) (estimating a lower return on investment in new 
drugs since the Hatch-Waxman Act was passed); Aaron S. Kesselheim, An Empirical 
Review of Major Legislation Affecting Drug Development: Past Experiences, Effects, and 
Unintended Consequences, 89 MILBANK Q. 450, 481 (2011) (stating that the impact of at 
least one of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s RCSs is controversial); Emily Michiko Morris, The 
Myth of Generic Pharmaceutical Competition Under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 22 FORDHAM 
INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 245, 286 (2012) (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act 
actually weakened incentives for pharmaceutical innovation). Notably, many 
commentators attribute innovation in the area of pharmaceuticals, at least partly, to the 
incentives provided by patents. See, e.g., JAMES BESSEN & MICHAEL MEURER, PATENT 
FAILURE: HOW JUDGES, BUREAUCRATS, AND LAWYERS PUT INNOVATORS AT RISK 13–16 
(2008); Benjamin N. Roin, Unpatentable Drugs and the Standards of Patentability, 87 
TEX. L. REV. 503, 556 (2009). But see Cynthia M. Ho, Drugged Out: How Cognitive Bias 
Hurts Drug Innovation, 51 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 419, 424–26 (2014) (arguing that the role of 
patents in providing incentives for innovation in the area of pharmaceuticals has been 
exaggerated and mischaracterized).  
 12 This is evidenced, for example, by the biotechnology industry’s insistence on the 
institution of RCSs during the legislative discussions that preceded the enactment of the 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA). See infra notes 217 & 229.  
 13 See infra notes 26 & 33; Yaniv Heled, Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in 
Biological Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. 
REV. 419, 450–61 (2012) (discussing the advantages of RCSs over patents). Advocates for 
RCSs point out shortcomings in the patent regime to which RCSs provide a better 
alternative. Id. at 451. For example, RCSs are less vulnerable to legal challenges than 
patents, thus affording RCS right-holders more certainty. Id. at 455 nn.161 & 163. Even 
the considerable investment required to gain FDA approval is often cheaper than obtaining 
and defending patents. Id. at 455 n.160.  
  Biologic producers have also hotly debated the optimum period during which 
original biologics should have exclusivity. See Donna M. Gitter, Innovators and Imitators: 
An Analysis of Proposed Legislation Implementing an Abbreviated Approval Pathway for 
Follow-On Biologics in the United States, 35 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 555, 613–16 (2008) 
(reviewing some of the proposals for exclusivity periods in original biological products). 
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agreements, and foreign legislation over the last few years, suggesting that 
even more new RCS regimes will likely be instituted in the future in the 
United States and elsewhere.14  
These developments bring to the forefront fundamental questions 
regarding the nature and characteristics of RCSs.15 Expanding on the 
discussion in Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities in Biological 
Pharmaceuticals—Do We Really Need Both?16 this Article seeks to (1) define 
and characterize RCSs in general, (2) explain the mechanics of RCSs in the 
context of technological innovation, (3) offer a taxonomy of the different types 
of RCSs instituted to date in federal legislation, and (4) provide a survey of the 
federal RCS regimes instituted with the purpose of creating incentives for 
technological innovation. In so doing, this Article seeks to contribute to laying 
the groundwork to facilitate a more robust discussion of RCSs.   
Part II of this Article defines RCSs, provides a general background about 
them, and explains why the new name proposed here, “regulatory competitive 
shelters,” is more fitting than previously proposed names in describing these 
legal institutions. Part II also offers an explanation of the way in which RCSs 
work in the context of technological innovation. It then suggests a 
nomenclature and taxonomy of the different kinds of RCSs instituted to date in 
the United States. Part III provides a review of federal RCS regimes instituted 
                                                                                                                     
 14 See, e.g., the numerous RCS regimes proposed during the discussions preceding the 
enactment of BPCIA, infra note 227; the RCS regime under the GAIN Act, infra Part 
III.H; and the additional regime proposed under the MODDERN Cures Act bill, infra note 
244; see also Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Data Secrecy in the Age of Regulatory Exclusivity, in 
THE LAW AND THEORY OF TRADE SECRECY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH 
467, 472–73, 491 (Rochelle C. Dreyfuss & Katherine J. Strandburg eds., 2011) [hereinafter 
Eisenberg 2011]; Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Patents and Regulatory Exclusivity, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF THE BIOPHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 167, 188 (P. 
Danzon & S. Nicholson eds., 2012) [hereinafter Eisenberg 2012]; John R. Thomas, Toward 
a Theory of Regulatory Exclusivities, in PATENT LAW IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 345, 346, 
370–75 (Ruth L. Okediji & Margo A. Bagley eds., 2014) (surveying proposals for the 
institution of additional RCS regimes and anticipating the establishment of additional RCS 
regimes in the future).  
 15 Legal literature has mostly addressed RCSs in the specific contexts of the particular 
legislative frameworks in which they play a role, but, with a few exceptions, has not 
dedicated much attention to them as such. See generally Eisenberg 2012, supra note 14; C. 
Scott Hemphill & Mark A. Lemley, Earning Exclusivity: Generic Drug Incentives and the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 947 (2011); Vincent J. Roth, Will FDA Data 
Exclusivity Make Biologic Patents Passé?, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 
249 (2013). But see Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Role of the FDA in Innovation Policy, 13 
MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 345 (2007) [hereinafter Eisenberg 2007] (generally 
characterizing the exclusivities administered by the FDA in the context of pharmaceutical 
technologies as “pseudo-patents”).  
 16 Heled, supra note 13, at 424 (comparing RCSs and patents in the context of 
biological pharmaceuticals, highlighting the advantages of RCSs over patents in that 
context and recommending the suspension of enforceability of patent rights covering such 
pharmaceutical products where RCSs are in place).  
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for the purpose of creating incentives for technological innovation17 while 
highlighting some of the common motifs described in Part II. Part IV tackles 
the question of why almost all RCS regimes instituted to date are administered 
by the FDA and what this fact may say about the general applicability of RCSs 
as a mechanism for spurring technological innovation. This Article concludes 
with outstanding questions regarding RCS regimes that merit further attention. 
II. REGULATORY COMPETITIVE SHELTERS—AN EXPOSITION  
A. Regulatory Competitive Shelters—Definition and Characterization 
Broadly defined, regulatory competitive shelters are competitive 
advantages resulting from statutory bars on regulatory action where such 
action is otherwise mandated and would have taken place but for the triggering 
of the bar. Thus, RCSs are the result of an administrative agency’s inability to 
take certain regulatory action that, had such action been taken, would have 
paved the way for competition in a certain product or market. The agency’s 
non-action18 (resulting from the statutory bar) creates an impediment to 
competition in a market or product regulated by the agency, thereby 
effectively sheltering the beneficiary of the earlier regulatory action from 
potential competition, typically by instigating exclusivity in the market or 
product.19 Hence, RCSs effectuate a competitive advantage in the relevant 
market or product and, often, even de facto monopoly status with respect to a 
particular product. Put metaphorically, regulatory competitive shelters are an 
exclusive “right of entry” into a regulated “territory,” wherein the right of 
entry is conferred by a government gatekeeper on one or a few individuals, 
thereby making the “territory” the sole domain of such individuals for a 
predetermined period of time, after which such “rights of entry” may be given 
to others as well.20  
                                                                                                                     
 17 As a legislative phenomenon, RCSs are not limited to the federal level. See, e.g., 
Chem. Producers & Distribs. Ass’n v. Helliker, 463 F.3d 871, 874–75 (9th Cir. 2006) 
(describing an RCS regime instituted by the state of California). 
 18 I use the term “non-action” rather than “inaction” so as to avoid the implication that 
agency action is appropriate and ought to be expected. However, there may be cases in 
which agency non-action in the context of RCSs may actually be “agency inaction”—a 
topic of substantial case law involving the review of agency’s discretion as to whether or 
not to take regulatory action. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831–35 (1985) 
(addressing the issue of reviewability of agency inaction).  
 19 As explained by Professor Rebecca Eisenberg in the context of RCSs administered 
by the FDA under the Hatch-Waxman Act, “[i]n effect, these provisions amount to FDA-
administered proprietary rights in regulatory data, awarded to encourage particular kinds of 
innovation in drug development rather than to protect consumers from unsafe or ineffective 
drugs. The practical effect is to defer generic competition, even without patent protection.” 
Eisenberg 2007, supra note 15, at 360.  
 20 Cf. Bruce S. Manheim Jr. et al., ‘Follow-On Biologics’: Ensuring Continued 
Innovation in the Biotechnology Industry, 25 HEALTH AFF. 394, 394 (2006) (defining 
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RCSs are different from most other kinds of administratively created 
exclusivities21 in the manner by which they are conferred upon the beneficiary. 
Whereas administratively created exclusivities are, typically, the result of an 
affirmative act of direct grant of the exclusivity by an administrative agency, 
the benefits conveyed by RCSs are usually not “granted” in the regular sense, 
but are rather byproducts of a triggering event that strips the agency of the 
power to partake in certain regulatory actions.22 Put more simply, RCSs do not 
necessitate a formal “nod” to validate their existence and confer their benefits. 
This is not to say that agency acknowledgement of the existence of an RCS or 
a beneficiary status thereof is at odds with the nature and purpose of RCSs. 
Rather, the benefits conferred under RCS regimes are byproducts of an 
inability of potential competitors to partake in a regulated activity, and nothing 
more. While the author is not aware of any RCS regimes in which the onset of 
an RCS is not automatically triggered, this characteristic does not seem to be a 
sine qua non of RCSs as it is possible to envision RCS regimes that would 
require official confirmation from the relevant administrative agency for the 
RCS to actually take effect. To illustrate: the FDA need not grant to a 
manufacturer of an orphan drug the seven-year exclusivity status in the drug as 
mandated under the Orphan Drug Act in order for this particular RCS to take 
effect; rather, the seven-year RCS is triggered automatically by the approval of 
the drug for an orphan condition.23 In other words, RCSs under the Orphan 
Drug Act are not conferred in the same sense that the United States Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) grants patents to applicants (including the 
issuance of a certificate and publishing the patent in official records). Rather, 
after the approval of a drug for an orphan condition, the FDA’s only obligation 
                                                                                                                     
“statutory exclusivity” as “the period of time in which the FDA is barred from approving a 
follow-on product”). 
 21 See infra notes 68–72 and accompanying text for examples of such exclusivities.  
 22 Examples of exclusivities that are the result of direct grants are patents and 
trademarks whose conferral requires an affirmative act of issuance and registration by the 
U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO). RCSs, by contrast, are the result of a 
triggering event, which may or may not directly pertain to the benefit conferred by the 
RCS. In other words, the triggering event that strips the administrative agency of its power 
to take regulatory action, thereby creating the benefit that is the subject of the RCS, may be 
seemingly unrelated to the RCS.  
  Notably, in some cases, the RCS’s triggering event may be closely related to the 
RCS itself. Examples are: (1) the designation of a certain medical condition as a rare 
disease as a precondition for the triggering of the seven-year market exclusivity RCS under 
the Orphan Drug Act; and (2) the need for FDA’s finding of satisfactory fulfillment of a 
clinical studies request pertaining to pediatric populations, which is necessary to trigger the 
six-month pediatric exclusivity RCS. See infra notes 146 & 198, respectively, and 
accompanying text. However, even in these cases, the designation and finding of 
satisfactory fulfillment by the administrative agency, while closely related to the context of 
their respective RCSs, is not the same as direct grant of the exclusivity. 
 23 See infra Part III.B. 
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is to refrain from approving follow-on (a.k.a. “me too”) versions of that drug 
for the same conditions for a period of seven years.24 
For the same reason that they do not require an affirmative act of formal 
grant, RCSs typically confer no specific actionable right on their 
beneficiaries.25 This does not mean that an applicant for regulatory approval of 
a product whose approval triggers an RCS cannot reasonably rely on the 
benefits that the applicant expects to gain from the onset of that RCS. Rather, 
RCSs do not involve any right that can be identified by name or which may 
create adversity between the RCS’s beneficiary and a subsequent applicant. 
This, in turn, does not harm RCS-beneficiaries. One of the most important 
aspects of RCSs is that they are “automatically enforced” by their 
administering agency.  
As mentioned earlier, RCSs are the result of non-action by an agency, 
which is due to a temporary loss of the agency’s ability to use its powers to 
benefit applicants subsequent to the RCS-beneficiary. Stated differently, the 
enforcement of RCSs is a result of the regulatory shelter created by the 
administrative agency and, thus, requires no enforcement action per se on the 
part of RCS-beneficiaries.26 Hence, the benefits arising from RCSs are 
incidental to the bar imposed on the relevant administering agency and 
typically do not require enforcement action per se by the beneficiary. By the 
same token, beneficiaries of RCSs are not in a position to “enforce” their 
RCSs on potential third party competitors, although in some cases RCS-
beneficiaries may petition the administering agency to take regulatory action 
against third parties.27  
RCSs may serve to achieve a variety of conceivable purposes in different 
regulatory contexts and settings.28 This Article, however, will focus on 
                                                                                                                     
 24 Id.  
 25 In this regard, RCSs are different, for example, from patents that grant their 
recipient the ability to exclude others from practicing the invention as claimed under the 
patent. See 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012).  
 26 See Elizabeth H. Dickinson, FDA’s Role in Making Exclusivity Determinations, 54 
FOOD & DRUG L.J. 195, 195 (1999) (“FDA enforces exclusivity protections; they are not 
asserted independently in the same type of proceedings in which patent rights are 
asserted.”); Joyce Wing Yan Tam, Note, Biologics Revolution: The Intersection of 
Biotechnology, Patent Law, and Pharmaceutical Regulation, 98 GEO. L.J. 535, 553 (2010) 
(“Marketing exclusivities are particularly powerful . . . . This perfect monopoly protection 
is automatic and does not require the entity holding the [product] exclusivity to act—a 
sharp contrast to patent rights, which are only enforced when the patent holder prevails in a 
legal action.”); ALEX M. BRILL, PROPER DURATION OF DATA EXCLUSIVITY FOR GENERIC 
BIOLOGICS: A CRITIQUE 6 (2008), available at http://www.matrixglobaladvisors.com/ 
storage/mga-studies/Brill_Exclusivity_in_Biogenerics.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
S825-8DVQ (“Data exclusivity is a definitive monopoly and a government grant, as it 
allows the innovator’s data to be protected without challenge.”).  
 27 See, e.g., 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2014) (providing a mechanism known as “citizen 
petition” to request the FDA to take regulatory action).  
 28 For example, RCSs may conceivably serve to promote private investment in 
infrastructure, compliance with voluntary standards recommended (but not mandated) by 
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describing and characterizing the important brand of RCSs instituted to create 
incentives for the development of new technology and make it available for 
use by the public.29 Such RCSs are highly similar to patents. This similarity is 
not coincidental, as RCSs were first created in response to perceived needs 
that were unmet under patent law.30 However, RCSs are different from patents 
in the way they make the technological innovation that they “shelter” available 
to the public.  
Patents are explicitly designed to disclose relevant information regarding 
the technology to the public (in the specification portion of the patent 
document) so as to make it possible for members of the public to make and use 
the invention.31 RCSs, however, make the technologies they cover available to 
the public in three important ways. First, RCSs provide economic incentives, 
in the form of the competitive advantages to disseminate approved regulated 
technologies, thereby making them available to the public.32 Second, as a 
byproduct of the grant of regulatory approval, RCSs signal that the societal 
value of the technologies subject to RCS was evaluated by the administering 
                                                                                                                     
an administrative agency, etc. See also Thomas, supra note 14, at 370 (“[R]egulatory 
exclusivities could in theory be applied to virtually any regulated product.”). 
 29 According to Professor John Thomas, the purpose of RCSs, including many of 
those discussed in this Article, must not be viewed as the incentivizing of innovation but 
rather as the production of socially valuable data necessary for expensive regulatory 
processes. See Thomas, supra note 14, at 346. Thomas makes a compelling argument that 
RCSs “should be framed as sui generis rights that complement, rather than supplement the 
patent system” and that “[t]he account of [RCSs] as a patent-like innovation promoter has 
both shortcomings and descriptive flaws.” Id. at 346, 360–62. Nevertheless, he 
acknowledges that at least some RCS regimes break away from the traditional role of RCS 
regimes as incentives to generate data as they aim to supplement patents and even replace 
them altogether. See id. at 363, 375 (discussing the Biologics Price Competition and 
Innovation Act of 2009 and the MODDERN Cures Act).  
  Without addressing all of Professor Thomas’s many compelling arguments, which 
exceeds the scope of this Article, as a practical matter, the incentivizing of technological 
innovation and the production of socially valuable data are not mutually exclusive and may 
well coincide in the context of RCSs. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, RCSs may serve to 
promote a variety of purposes and social goals. Thus, while Professor Thomas’s position 
regarding the purpose of RCSs reflects good public policy, the characterization of RCSs 
exclusively as a means for production of socially valuable data does not seem to 
necessarily follow.  
 30 See discussion, infra Parts III.A–C. 
 31 This “trait” of patents is embodied in patent law’s enablement and written 
description requirements. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012) (“The [patent] specification shall 
contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making 
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any person skilled in 
the art to which it pertains . . . to make and use the same . . . .”). 
 32 By contrast, patents do not necessarily provide incentives to make patented 
products available to the public. Benjamin Roin observed and analyzed this difference 
between patents and RCSs in the context of the pharmaceutical industry. See Roin, supra 
note 11, at 555–56 (lamenting the non-pursuit of development of potentially beneficial 
drugs due to a lack of patent protection for the resulting product).  
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agency and found to be satisfactory based on the regulatory requirements 
imposed by the administering agency.33 In other words, the onset of an RCS 
triggered by the approval of a regulated technology serves as an indirect signal 
to the public that the information submitted to the reviewing agency in 
connection with the application for the marketing of the technology was 
sufficient to meet the agency’s merit standards (or not, in the case of a 
rejection).34 And third, in many cases RCS regimes provide a way for 
manufacturers of follow-on products to rely on data regarding the technology 
that is the subject of the RCS, which was submitted to the administering 
agency in connection with the approval of the original product, when these 
manufacturers seek approval for their follow-on products.35 In so doing, RCS 
regimes facilitate not only efficiencies in the production and utilization of data 
necessary for the regulatory approval process by the administering agency, but 
also the widespread dissemination of the technology upon expiration of the 
RCS period.  
B. The Mechanics of Regulatory Competitive Shelters 
The purpose of all RCSs is to provide specifically tailored incentives 
intended to spur technological innovation in select areas in which such 
incentives are deemed necessary.36 Instituting an RCS regime requires an 
agency to administer the regime and function as a gatekeeper whose actions 
would instigate the creation of the RCSs. The role of such administrative 
agencies in RCS regimes is, thus, twofold: (1) they serve as “examining” 
bodies in charge of evaluating the merit of relevant technologies; and (2) they 
function as administrators of the relevant exclusivities.  
The structure of basic RCS regimes may be illustrated as follows: (1) a 
product manufacturer (M)37 invests resources developing a technology that 
may come to fruition in a product (P); (2) M then submits an application for 
marketing approval of P to the relevant administrative agency (AA) in charge 
of regulating that area of technology or type of product; (3) AA reviews the 
application to determine whether P meets its merit standards, usually by 
evaluating P’s safety and efficacy; (4) if P is found to meet AA’s regulatory 
approval criteria, AA grants M marketing approval for P; (5) AA then refrains 
                                                                                                                     
 33 By contrast, patents do not reflect the direct social value of the patented inventions 
and are merely reflective of the novelty, non-obviousness and potential utility of the 
patented invention. See id. at 536–37.  
 34 Notably, prominent scholars have argued that in the case of pharmaceutical 
technologies, the information submitted to the administrative agency should also be made 
available to the public. See infra notes 42–45 and accompanying text.  
 35 See infra notes 39–45 and accompanying text.  
 36 See infra Part III. 
 37 For simplicity, in this Article I will generally refer to the parties involved in the 
R&D, application for marketing approval, making and distributing of a product as that 
product’s “manufacturer.”  
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from taking certain regulatory actions with respect to subsequent applications, 
(e.g., it does not accept or approve applications for products similar or 
identical to P (“follow-on products”) for a certain amount of time (T) as 
proscribed under the RCS-instituting statute, thereby fully or partially 
sheltering M from competition in P);38 (6) using its competitive advantage, M 
is able to sell P at a high profit margin, thereby recouping its investment in 
research and development (R&D) and regulatory costs; (7) upon the lapse of 
T, AA resumes its previously-barred regulatory action (e.g., begins accepting 
or approving applications for follow-on versions of P).  
This quid pro quo may be illustrated as follows:  
 
Table 1: Basic RCS Regime 
 
M Quid Pro Quo AA/the Public 
Gives Investment in technological innovation resulting in the development, approval, and marketing of P Receives 
Receives 
1. Examination of application for marketing of P 
2. Approval of application for marketing of P and 
opportunity to enter the market 
3. Sheltering from competition in P via RCS 




In addition to this basic RCS regime structure, some RCS regimes include, 
as an essential component, the authorization of the relevant administrative 
agency to use R&D information previously submitted to the agency by 
applicants in reviewing applications for follow-on products.39 Such 
authorization is typically a component of RCS regimes in which R&D 
information is required by the administrative agency in order to consider and 
approve technological products for marketing. In such regimes, the submitted 
information also serves an important function: facilitating approval of follow-
on products without requiring the re-submission of similar R&D information 
                                                                                                                     
 38 Such sheltering from competition may be more or less comprehensive, depending 
on the particular RCS regime and its underlying public policy goals. Compare the strong 
RCS afforded under the Orphan Drug Act and the relatively weak shelter from competition 
in pesticides under FIFRA. See infra Parts III.B & III.A, respectively.  
 39 See, e.g., 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(1) (2012) (in small molecule drugs); 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360j(h)(4)(A) (2012) (in medical devices); 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(3) (2012) (in biologics); 
21 U.S.C. § 360b(n) (2012) (in new animal drugs); 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(f)(iv) (2012) (in 
pesticides). Notably, the administrative agency may need to refer to information submitted 
by an applicant not only in connection with reviewing applications for follow-on products, 
but also in other situations that may require further review of such information (e.g., in 
evaluating new information collected in post-marketing studies of the regulated product).  
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by the follow-on applicant, so as to avoid societal waste.40 This, in turn, makes 
the development price of such follow-on products cheaper, thereby making 
these products more widely accessible.  
The use of an initial applicant’s R&D information by an administrative 
agency is known as “reference” and is often the raison d'être of the “pact” 
instituted under certain RCS regimes between the original product 
manufacturer and the public (as “represented” by the administrative agency).41 
Importantly, in the United States, the information submitted to administrative 
agencies (including, in many cases, clinical data) for the purpose of evaluating 
technologies is generally considered proprietary.42 Accordingly, such 
information is held in confidence by administrative agencies and usually is not 
shared directly with subsequent follow-on applicants or the general public.43 
                                                                                                                     
 40 See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1014–15 (1984) (explaining the 
rationale behind data sharing). 
 41 See Gitter, supra note 13, at 586 (acknowledging the goal of fostering a competitive 
market for safe biological pharmaceuticals while continuing to provide incentives for 
innovation); Bryan A. Liang, Regulating Follow-On Biologics, 44 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 363, 
388 (2007) (understanding the Hatch-Waxman Act to create a balance between the original 
manufacturer’s incentive to innovate and the goal of increasing the number of affordable 
and safe generic drugs available to the public). 
  Thus, in RCS regimes that include this component the administrative agency plays 
an additional (third) role, namely that of a “trustee” or “escrowee” holding the information 
submitted in confidence for future reference, as necessary, in the approval of applications 
for marketing of follow-on products. 
 42 See, e.g., in the context of FDA law, 21 U.S.C. § 331(j) (2012). This is, however, 
not the case in other countries, where such data is not kept in confidence, but rather is 
available to the public.  
  RCS regimes that facilitate a deposit of information, which may later be referenced 
by the administrative agency in reviewing applications for follow-on products, are 
reminiscent of trade secret regimes in several ways: (1) like trade secret regimes, they seek 
to create incentives for technological invention and innovation; (2) except for some 
information about the product itself, none of the information pertaining to know-how 
gained during its development is disclosed to the public, which enables the preservation of 
the proprietary value of this information; and (3) the barrier formed by the RCS regime—
like with trade secrets—is not necessarily insurmountable and may not apply to 
independent development of the same or a similar product. To clarify this point: just like 
independent development of a trade secret does not constitute misappropriation, RCSs do 
not necessarily pose a regulatory impediment to the review and approval of applications for 
competing products as such (although they certainly might do that, depending on the 
language of the statutory provision establishing the specific RCS).  
 43 Christine D. Galbraith, Dying to Know: A Demand for Genuine Public Access to 
Clinical Trial Results Data, 78 MISS. L.J. 705, 720 (2009) (noting the FDA’s treatment of 
drug data as proprietary). Data that is classifiable as a trade secret or confidential 
commercial information usually cannot be disclosed to the general public without the 
applicant’s authorization—in fact, the Trade Secrets Act criminalizes disclosure of this 
information by an FDA employee. 18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2012). Federal regulation broadly 
defines trade secrets and confidential commercial information. See 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(a) 
(2004) (defining trade secret as consisting of “any commercially valuable plan, formula, 
process, or device that is used for the making, preparing, compounding, or processing of 
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Rather, in “referring” to such information as part of the approval process of 
follow-on products, administrative agencies do not disclose the referenced 
information to the subsequent applicant but only use it internally in the 
evaluation of subsequent applications for follow-on products.44 Keeping such 
information in confidence, however, does not appear to be a crucial element of 
RCS regimes and may even be viewed as deadweight loss accompanying RCS 
regimes, which do not require disclosure of R&D information regarding the 
approved product. Indeed, as several prominent scholars have argued, keeping 
information submitted to an administrative agency in support of a regulatory 
filing in confidence is mostly, if not always, unjustified as a means of creating 
incentives for innovation and detrimental from a public policy perspective.45 
In RCS regimes that include such a “reference” component, the RCSs are 
typically crafted in the first place so as to provide sufficient competitive 
advantage to compensate the RCS-beneficiary (which submitted the 
information) for the later loss associated with the use of its proprietary 
information in the approval of third-party applications. The quid pro quo 
arrangements embodied in these types of RCS regimes, which I will refer to as 
“RCS Pacts,” may be summarized as follows: (1) the original product 
manufacturer (M1) invests resources in R&D of a technology that may come 
to fruition in a product (P1); (2) M1 then submits an application for marketing 
approval of P1 (including relevant information gathered during P1’s 
development) to the administrative agency (AA) in charge of regulating that 
area of technology or type of product; (3) AA reviews the application, 
including the information (D) submitted in support thereof, to determine 
whether P1 meets its merit standards (usually by evaluating P1’s safety and 
efficacy); (4) if P1 is found to meet AA’s regulatory approval criteria, AA 
                                                                                                                     
trade commodities and that can be said to be the end product of either innovation or 
substantial effort.”); 21 C.F.R. § 20.61(b) (2014) (defining confidential commercial 
information as “valuable data or information which is used in one’s business and is of a 
type customarily held in strict confidence . . . by the person to whom it belongs.”). 
 44 Such agency use of arguably proprietary information has been justified as one of 
“the burdens we all must bear in exchange for ‘the advantage of living and doing business 
in a civilized community.’” See Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1007 (citation omitted) 
(addressing the constitutionality of agency use of proprietary information in light of the 
Fifth Amendment).  
 45 See Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Problem of New Uses, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. 
& ETHICS 717, 720 (2005) (arguing that trade secrecy in clinical trials information 
truncates the social value of the information and is therefore problematic and proposing 
combining exclusive rights in product markets with public disclosure of data from clinical 
trials); Eisenberg 2011, supra note 14, at 468–73, 486; Eisenberg 2007, supra note 15, at 
380–84; Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Secrecy, Monopoly, and Access to Pharmaceuticals in 
International Trade Law: Protection of Marketing Approval Data Under the TRIPs 
Agreement, 45 HARV. INT’L L.J. 443, 448 (2004); Jerome H. Reichman, Rethinking the 
Role of Clinical Trial Data in International Intellectual Property Law: The Case for a 
Public Goods Approach, 13 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 1, 48–49 (2009); Marc A. 
Rodwin & John D. Abramson, Clinical Trial Data as a Public Good, 308 JAMA 871, 871 
(2012).  
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grants M1 marketing approval for P1 while keeping D for future reference 
when deciding on applications for marketing-approval of follow-on versions 
of P1 (P2s); (5) AA then refrains from referring to D or accepting or approving 
applications for P2s for a certain amount of time (T) as proscribed under the 
RCS-instituting statute, thereby sheltering M1 from competition in P1; (6) 
using its competitive advantage, M1 is able to sell P1 at a high profit margin, 
thereby recouping its investment (in R&D and regulatory costs); (7) upon the 
expiration of T, AA begins accepting or approving applications for P2s, 
whereas such applications may call for AA to refer to D in conducting its 
review;46 (8) AA approves applications for P2s, thereby ceasing its sheltering 
of M1 and opening the market in P1 to competition between M1 and follow-on 
product manufacturers (M2s) whose expenses in developing their P2s were 
much lower than those of M1 in developing P1; (9) in order to compete 
effectively, M2s offer their P2s for a lower price than that for which P1 is sold, 
thereby facilitating a drop in the price of P1 and the product in general;47 and 
(10) the resulting decrease in the product’s price makes it accessible to a 



















                                                                                                                     
 46 See supra notes 43–44 and accompanying text.  
 47 The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) estimates that when a M1’s competitive 
advantage is maintained by patents, about one year after the removal of such patents 
(through expiration or invalidation) and market entry of a generic, on average, P2s take 
over ninety percent of P1’s unit sales and sell for fifteen percent of the original price of P1. 
See FED. TRADE COMM’N, PAY-FOR-DELAY: HOW DRUG COMPANY PAY-OFFS COST 
CONSUMERS BILLIONS 8 (2010), available at https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/ 
documents/reports/pay-delay-how-drug-company-pay-offs-cost-consumers-billions-federal 
-trade-commission-staff-study/100112payfordelayrpt.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
933E-X5XX.  
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The quid pro quo of RCS Pacts is illustrated in the following table:  
 
Table 2: RCS Regime with a “Reference” Component 
 
M Quid Pro Quo AA/the Public 
Gives 
1. Investment in technological innovation 
resulting in the development, approval, and 
marketing of P1 
2. Submission of D, which may be referred to in 
the approval of P2s after T (resulting in P2s sold 
for lower prices, thereby increasing accessibility) 
Receives 
Receives 
1. Examination of application (including D) for 
marketing of P  
2. Approval of application for marketing of P and 
opportunity to enter the market 
3. Sheltering from competition in P1 via RCS 




Importantly, all of the RCS regimes instituted to date essentially bar the 
relevant administrative agency from taking at least one of the following three 
regulatory actions during T: (1) accepting applications for follow-on products, 
(2) approving applications for follow-on products, and (3) referring to data 
submitted to the agency in connection with an earlier application during the 
review and evaluation of subsequent applications. However, RCSs do not 
necessarily have to be limited to these particular regulatory impediments. 
Indeed, hypothetically, RCSs may pertain to any regulatory action that an 
agency is authorized to take. For example, if administrative agency AA is 
authorized to issue advisory opinions, an RCS may prohibit AA from issuing 
such opinions for a certain period of time, so as to benefit M1. Similarly, if 
AA is required to provide funding for certain activities, an RCS may prohibit 
AA from providing such funding for a certain period of time subsequent to the 
grant of such funding to M1. Clearly, one could envision many more kinds of 
RCSs than those that exist under current legislation. As explained in Part III of 
this Article, RCS Pacts have been a strong impetus to the institution of RCS 
regimes and are an important element of such regimes.  
C. A Taxonomy of Regulatory Competitive Shelters 
The scope of protection (or sheltering) conferred under each RCS regime 
depends on the legislation that defines the powers of the administrative agency 
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administering that RCS.48 Accordingly, the actual bundle of rights that comes 
along with each RCS depends on the specific definition and context of the 
RCS as well as on the administering agency’s understanding of the RCS’s 
instituting statute. In other words, the protection conferred under each RCS is 
directly related to what the administrative agency administering the RCS 
regime is able to “shelter” the RCS holder from, which in turn depends on the 
powers that the agency has under the relevant legislation and generally.49 For 
example, withholding FDA approval for marketing a follow-on version of 
pharmaceutical drug “X” means that, in accordance with FDA legislation, 
manufacturers of follow-on versions of X are not allowed to introduce such 
versions into interstate commerce50 or import it into the United States without 
prior FDA approval.51 This, in turn, potentially confers on the original 
manufacturer of X a shelter from competing sales of follow-on versions of X 
and their importation into the United States. These shelters are different, for 
example, from the rights conferred under the Patent Act to exclude others from 
making, using, selling, offering to sell and importing into the United States the 
patented invention.52 Thus, the RCS pertaining to X under FDA legislation 
would not necessarily shelter the original drug manufacturer from competing 
use, offering for sale, or making of X.53  
Despite the fact that different RCSs may vary in the type and scope of the 
benefits and rights that they confer, all RCSs are, by definition, geared towards 
limiting competition in some way. In that vein, all of the currently-instituted 
RCSs may be characterized as falling into one or more of the subgroups 
described in the following sections.  
1. Market Exclusivity  
This group of RCSs is defined by a period during which potential 
competitors (M2s) are not allowed to enter the market for a certain regulated 
product (P) with their own version of that product.54 Market exclusivity is 
achieved by a prohibition imposed on an administrative agency (AA) to accept 
or approve applications for comparable or identical products (P2s) for the 
duration of the exclusivity period. Market exclusivity is typically a strong RCS 
                                                                                                                     
 48 As explained in the previous subsection, the type and scope of RCSs depends on 
the regulatory action that the relevant administrative agency is statutorily prohibited to take 
for the duration of the RCS. See supra Part II.B.  
 49 Id. 
 50 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 331(d), 355(j) (2012).  
 51 21 U.S.C. § 331(aa).  
 52 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2012). A notable exception to this rule is the exclusion of 
partaking in such acts “solely for uses reasonably related to the development and 
submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture, use, or 
sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1).  
 53 See 21 U.S.C. § 331 (detailing food and drug manufacturing and sale prohibitions).  
 54 See Gitter, supra note 13, at 573 n.113 (defining “market exclusivity”).  
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and confers on its beneficiary (M1) the ability to sell the product (P1) at a high 
profit margin. Nonetheless, it is important to note that market exclusivities do 
not guarantee market power55 to their beneficiaries. Indeed, there is currently 
no example of a market exclusivity, which has by its definition conferred such 
complete reign over a particular market so as to bar competition in that market 
under any circumstances.56 Accordingly, for example, a seven-year market 
exclusivity under the Orphan Drug Act does not preclude potential competitors 
from developing their own drug for a certain rare disease and entering the 
market for treatment of that rare disease prior to the lapse of the seven-year 
market exclusivity period, provided that their drug is not identical to (or a 
follow-on version of) the drug that is subject to the market exclusivity.57  
2. Data Exclusivity 
This group of RCSs is defined by a period during which subsequent 
applicants (M2s) may not rely on or seek reference to information (D) 
previously submitted to an administrative agency (AA) in support of an 
application for marketing approval of a previously-approved product (P1), for 
the purpose of approving their own follow-on version of that product (P2).58 
Data exclusivity is achieved by a prohibition preventing the AA holding D 
from referring to such information in its review and approval of later 
applications for marketing approval of P2s for the duration of the exclusivity 
                                                                                                                     
 55 Market power is defined as “[t]he ability to reduce output and raise prices above the 
competitive level—specifically, above marginal cost—for a sustained period, and to make 
a profit by doing so.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1058 (9th ed. 2009). In antitrust law, a 
large amount of market power may constitute monopoly power. Id. Further, “[i]n economic 
terms, market power is the ability to raise prices without a total loss of sales; without 
market power, consumers shop around to find a rival offering a better deal.” Id. (quoting 
from 54 AM. JUR. 2D Monopolies, Restraints of Trade, and Unfair Trade Practices § 49, at 
110 n.87 (1996)). 
 56 Nevertheless (potential antitrust law issues aside), the institution of such strong 
RCSs is not unthinkable where the public policy goal at the heart of the RCS regime would 
necessitate particularly strong incentives. In the context of pharmaceuticals, for example, 
such an RCS may work its effect by barring the FDA from approving any drugs for a 
certain condition or disease for the period of the RCS subsequent to the approval of a first 
product to enter the market. Under such a hypothetical RCS regime, an original 
manufacturer of a drug for such a condition or disease would be sheltered from any 
competition by any maker of a potentially competing drug, regardless of whether the 
potentially competing drug is a follow-on version of the original drug, even if the 
potentially competing product is proven safer or more effective than the original drug.  
 57 See Richard Y. Cheung et al., Orphan Drug Policies: Implications for the United 
States, Canada, and Developing Countries, 12 HEALTH L.J. 183, 185 (2004).  
 58 See LAURENCE J. KOTLIKOFF, STIMULATING INNOVATION IN THE BIOLOGICS 
INDUSTRY: A BALANCED APPROACH TO MARKETING EXCLUSIVITY 3, 5 (2008), available at 
http://www.kotlikoff.net/sites/default/files/Kotlikoff_Innovation_in_Biologics 21.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3TSM-8ZNG (discussing the terms data and market 
exclusivities). 
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period (T). Data exclusivities, however, do not preclude subsequent applicants, 
who do not seek to rely on data submitted by P1s, from submitting their own, 
independently developed data in support of applications for the approval of 
their own products that may compete, once approved, with P1.59 Rather, data 
exclusivities operate by maintaining the barriers to market entry that are 
associated with requirements for data as a pre-condition for the administrative 
agency’s approval of a product for marketing.60 As discussed earlier,61 the 
term “data exclusivity” has been defined rather loosely in the literature 
discussing the various RCS regimes.62 Still, the resemblances borne by all data 
exclusivities to other RCSs should not lead to the common misperception that 
all RCSs are data exclusivities. 
3. Generic Exclusivity 
This group of RCSs is defined by a subtype of market exclusivity granted 
to manufacturers (M2s) of approved follow-on products (P2s) during which an 
administrative agency (AA) will not approve applications subsequent to a first 
approved follow-on application, where such applications are submitted by 
even later applicants (M3s) who seek approval for the marketing of their own 
version of the follow-on product (P3s).63 Generic exclusivities are usually 
meant to serve as an incentive for the entry of follow-on products into markets 
that are characterized by being monopolistic or where one manufacturer 
(typically of the original or reference product) has market power. Generic 
exclusivities tend to create duopolistic markets in which the original product 
manufacturer and the generic exclusivity beneficiary—the manufacturer of the 
follow-on product—both have market power.64 The term “generic exclusivity” 
                                                                                                                     
 59 See David E. Adelman & Christopher M. Holman, Misplaced Fears in the 
Legislative Battle over Affordable Biotech Drugs, 50 IDEA 565, 569 (2010). Submission of 
independently gathered data by subsequent applicants is, however, usually discouraged by 
the fact that such subsequent applicants are typically unable to secure any kind of 
exclusivity—patent or RCS—in their follow-on products that would enable them to 
recuperate the costs associated with the data gathering.  
 60 Id.  
 61 See infra Part II.D.  
 62 See, e.g., Gitter, supra note 13, at 572 n.108 (referring to “data exclusivity” as the 
period during which the FDA cannot approve an Abbreviated New Drug Application 
(ANDA) for a generic drug); Gerald J. Mossinghoff, Overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act 
and Its Impact on the Drug Development Process, 54 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 187, 189 (1999) 
(explaining that a period of exclusivity during which a generic version of a drug cannot be 
approved is generally referred to as “data exclusivity”). 
 63 To further clarify: generic exclusivity is a period during which AA will not approve 
P3s subsequent to the approval of a P2, whereas M3s who submit such P3 applications—
like M2 who submitted the application for P2 before them—seek to rely on D submitted by 
M1 in connection with P1.  
 64 See Gitter, supra note 13, at 573 (noting that during the 180-day period the generic 
drug “shares duopoly prices with the Brand-name drug”). 
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is often used in the legal literature in connection with the RCS regimes 
administered by the FDA pertaining to pharmaceutical products.65 
Although all of the RCSs instituted to date fall into one of these three 
exclusivity types, it is important to recognize that there could be RCSs that do 
not fall under any of them. By their definition, RCSs could, hypothetically, 
pertain to any statutorily mandated action by any administrative agency. Thus, 
one could envision RCSs pertaining to an administrative agency’s ability to 
exempt a potential beneficiary from a certain aspect of its regulation, grant it a 
special tax status, or provide it with government funding (while refraining 
from doing the same thing for its competitors), issue an agency opinion or 
guidance document per the request of a particular beneficiary (again, while 
refraining from taking the same action in response to requests by others), and 
more. Viewed in this light, it becomes apparent that market exclusivity, data 
exclusivity, and generic exclusivity are but a few kinds of many possible 
RCSs. 
D. Regulatory Competitive Shelters: Nomenclature 
There is much confusion and incoherence within the literature discussing 
RCSs with respect to the name and terms used to describe them as a legal and 
regulatory phenomenon.66 Needless to say, this inconsistency is unhelpful and, 
at times, even harmful for the discussion of RCSs. For this reason as well as to 
steer the discussion away from unnecessary controversy regarding the correct 
meaning of this term or another, a new name—regulatory competitive 
shelters—is proposed herein for this regulatory institution. The name 
“regulatory competitive shelters” also better describes the type of exclusivities 
and exclusivity regimes discussed in this Article than the most commonly used 
terms “regulatory exclusivities,” “statutory exclusivities,” and “data 
exclusivities.”67 The terms “regulatory exclusivities” and “statutory 
exclusivities,” for one, do not draw a distinction between the various different 
kinds of exclusivities administered by administrative agencies and cannot 
serve to distinguish, for example, between patents,68 monopoly rights granted 
to utility companies in certain jurisdictions,69 plant variety protection,70 
                                                                                                                     
 65 See, e.g., Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 15, at 948. 
 66 See Thomas, supra note 14, at 349.  
 67 See, e.g., Heled, supra note 13, at 419 (“Patents vs. Statutory Exclusivities . . .”); 
Brian F. McMahon, The Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act of 2009: 
Legislative Imprudence, Patent Devaluation, and the False Start of A Multi-Billion Dollar 
Industry, 100 KY. L.J. 635, 641 (2012) (using the term “regulatory exclusivity”); Roth, 
supra note 15, at 277–78; John R. Thomas, Into a Silver Age: U.S. Patent Law 1992—
2012, 23 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 525, 540–42 (2013) (discussing “the 
rise of regulatory exclusivities”). 
 68 Patents are administered under 35 U.S.C §§ 100–130 (2012). 
 69 For example, the Georgia Territorial Electric Service Act provides a mechanism for 
assigning geographical monopolies to electrical suppliers. GA. CODE ANN. §§ 46-3-2, 46-3-
4 (2004). Another noteworthy example is the entitlement of the United States Postal 
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trademarks,71 and the new chemical entity exclusivity instituted under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act.72 Hence, these terms do not point at the kind of 
exclusivities discussed in this Article with sufficient specificity and are, 
arguably, generic to any kind of exclusivity mandated by a statute or 
administered by a regulatory body. Conversely, the term “regulatory 
competitive shelter” is by its very name specific to the unique circumstances 
and attributes characterizing the exclusivities discussed in this Article.73  
Similarly, the broadly used term “data exclusivity” or “data protection” is 
also inadequate for describing the various kinds of RCSs. This term was 
originally used to describe some of the earlier RCSs, including the famous 
new chemical entity (NCE) exclusivity created under the Hatch-Waxman Act. 
As such, it appears that the fame of the Hatch-Waxman regime as well as the 
absence of a better term to describe RCSs in general have made “data 
exclusivity” synonymous with any and all kinds of RCSs. However, as 
explained later in this paper, data exclusivity is but one kind of RCS having its 
own specific characteristics and purpose.74 Therefore, using the term “data 
exclusivity” as a general name for all RCSs is both overbroad and a 
mischaracterization because it fails to capture the novel qualities and unique 
purposes of many particular RCSs.  
Being more specific and accurate, the new name “regulatory competitive 
shelter” is, therefore, not only a better descriptor of the benefits discussed in 
this Article, but also avoids the conflation of different issues that might result 
from overbroad and inaccurate use of some of the “old” terms.  
E. Innovation-Incentivizing Regulatory Competitive Shelters—Common 
Motifs 
Owing to their structure and mechanism, RCSs meant to promote 
technological innovation have several noteworthy common features. 
1. Limitation in Time 
While non-RCS exclusivities may or may not be limited in time, all RCSs 
have a predetermined statutory term.75 Because the ultimate purpose of RCSs 
                                                                                                                     
Service, which receives special federal protection from competition. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1693–
1699 (2012); 39 U.S.C. §§ 601–606 (2012) (prohibiting private competition within the 
boundaries of the USPS’ monopoly with the threat of civil and criminal sanctions).  
 70 Administered by the Plant Variety Protection Office in the Department of 
Agriculture instituted under the Plant Variety Protection Act. See Pub. L. No. 91-577, 84 
Stat. 1542 (1970) (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2321–2583 (2012)).  
 71 Administered under 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051–1072 (2012). 
 72 See infra notes 167–68 and accompanying text.  
 73 See supra Part II.A.  
 74 See supra Part II.C.  
 75 See infra Part III.  
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is to provide incentives for technological innovation—an ongoing process by 
definition—and because competition is perceived as the drive for innovation, 
RCSs ought not to be indefinite. Rather, RCSs seek to confer upon their 
beneficiaries competitive advantages sufficient to recoup their expenses and 
compensate them for their time and effort. An indefinite competitive 
advantage would achieve the opposite result by making such RCSs’ 
beneficiaries complacent and preventing potential competitors from ever 
competing effectively. The temporariness of RCSs is essential in order to 
promote the former and prevent the latter. 
2. Low Contestability  
Because they are a result of agency action and involve no conferral of an 
identifiable right on their beneficiaries, contesting RCSs is difficult and can 
only be done by challenging the action or non-action of the relevant 
administrative agency, e.g., by calling into question the agency’s “failure” to 
approve an application to market a regulated product or by granting one 
inappropriately.76 If one is to view RCSs as the consequence of “agency 
inaction,” the prospects of successful challenges in court are low from the 
outset because under current Supreme Court precedent, challenging 
administrative agencies’ inaction is unlikely to be successful.77 Furthermore, 
                                                                                                                     
 76 Compared with patents, for example—another form of administratively created 
exclusivity meant to provide incentives for the development of technology—RCSs are 
relatively unsusceptible to legal attacks. This is because patents, while presumed valid 
upon issuance, are subject to several different types of challenges to their validity that may 
arise in several different settings, including post-issuance proceedings in the USPTO, 
defense arguments in patent infringement suits, and suits for a declaratory judgment. Such 
challenges can and often do result in the partial or complete invalidation of the challenged 
patents. See John R. Allison & Mark A. Lemley, Empirical Evidence on the Validity of 
Litigated Patents, 26 AIPLA Q.J. 185, 205–07 (1998) (reporting a 46% invalidity rate in 
patent litigation); Kimberly A. Moore, Judges, Juries and Patent Cases—An Empirical 
Peek Inside the Black Box, 99 MICH. L. REV. 365, 390 (2000) (reporting a 33% invalidity 
rate in patent trials alone). As a result, patents are often viewed as substantially exposed to 
legal challenges throughout their term. See Brill, supra note 26, at 6 (“Patents can, and 
frequently are, subject to legal challenge and therefore contain some amount of uncertainty 
for the patent holder. Data exclusivity is not challengeable in court and therefore is not 
uncertain.”).  
 77 See Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 831 (1985) (“This Court has recognized on 
several occasions over many years that an agency’s decision not to prosecute or enforce, 
whether through civil or criminal process, is a decision generally committed to an agency’s 
absolute discretion.”). The low likelihood of success of an attempt to challenge 
administrative agencies’ inaction is especially true in the context of drug law. See id. at 
835–36 (rejecting the argument that the FFDCA’s prohibitions of “misbranding” and the 
introduction of “new drugs” absent agency approval supply courts with “law to apply” and, 
accordingly, that they do not provide a basis for judicial review of an FDA decision not to 
take enforcement action in the area of drug law); K-V Pharm. Co. v. U.S. Food & Drug 
Admin., 889 F. Supp. 2d 119, 133 (D.D.C. 2012) (refraining from compelling the FDA to 
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challenging an agency’s interpretation of laws instituting RCSs would be 
subject to the exacting review standard of the Chevron doctrine under which 
courts usually defer to agency decisions78 unless a decision is found to be 
“arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance 
with the law.”79 As recognized by the District Court for the District of 
Columbia, “[t]his standard of review is narrow and highly deferential; it 
presumes agency action to be valid, and it prohibits a court from substituting 
its judgment for that of the agency.”80 The deference afforded to agency 
decisions is all the more justified and necessary in matters involving RCSs, 
which are typically “complex and highly technical [and] in which the 
identification and classification of relevant criteria require significant expertise 
and entail the exercise of judgment grounded in policy concerns.”81 
Hence, despite the fact that some RCS regimes are subject to agency-
specific pathways for challenging agency decisions (including ones involving 
RCSs),82 and although lawsuits against administrative agencies regarding their 
decisions on matters involving RCSs are not unheard of, RCSs are relatively 
unsusceptible to legal challenges.83 Indeed, the low success rate of claims 
                                                                                                                     
take enforcement action against compounding pharmacies); see also Brill, supra note 26, at 
6 (“Data exclusivity is not challengeable in court . . . .”). 
 78 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 
(1984) (“We have long recognized that considerable weight should be accorded to an 
executive department’s construction of a statutory scheme . . . .”). Under the Chevron 
doctrine, courts generally grant agencies’ discretionary decisions and actions, which rely 
on statutes on whose administration they are in charge, a great measure of deference and 
are not easily persuaded to set them aside so long as: (1) “Congress has [not] directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue;” and (2) “the agency’s answer is based on a 
permissible construction of the statute.” Id. at 842–43. If both of these conditions are met, 
then the agency’s construction of the statute receives “considerable weight” and “the 
principle of deference to administrative interpretations” ought to be followed. Id. at 844. 
 79 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012).  
 80 See ViroPharma, Inc. v. Hamburg, 898 F. Supp. 2d 1, 16–17 (D.D.C. 2012).  
 81 See Thomas Jefferson Univ. v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 505 (1994). 
 82 For example, FDA law provides parties seeking to challenge or call into question 
the agency’s decisions involving RCSs with a regulatory petition mechanism known as 
“citizen petition.” See 21 C.F.R. § 10.30 (2014). 
 83 Of more than two dozen court opinions dated through early 2013 analyzed by the 
author, in which issues directly involved an administrative agency’s decision affecting the 
disposition of an RCS, challenges of the agency decisions succeeded in only 15% of the 
cases. See Yaniv Heled, RCS Cases Analysis (2014) (unpublished document) (on file with 
author). On the other hand, agency decisions were upheld in 77% of the cases (the 
remaining cases included no conclusive result). Id. Notably, the rate of overturning agency 
decisions is disproportionately high in cases involving the 180-day generic exclusivity 
RCS instituted under the Hatch-Waxman Act. See infra notes 171–72 and accompanying 
text. This RCS was the topic of dispute in 100% of the cases in which agency decisions 
affecting the disposition of an RCS were overturned. Heled, supra. In other words, the rate 
of overturning agency decisions affecting the disposition of an RCS other than the 180-day 
generic exclusivity under the Hatch-Waxman Act is 0%. Id.  
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challenging agency decisions pertaining to RCSs as well as the relative rarity 
of such cases (as compared to patent infringement lawsuits, for example) 
supports the view that RCSs are a reliable and effective means of conferring 
competitive advantages.84 
This hardiness, while highly valued by beneficiaries of RCSs, also has 
potentially troubling ramifications. Namely, the same characteristics that make 
RCSs less susceptible to legal challenges also render them less vulnerable to 
routine judicial review than other administratively granted benefits. 
Furthermore, because RCSs are a byproduct of agency decisions that often do 
not directly pertain to the RCSs themselves (e.g., whether to approve a drug 
for marketing), RCSs are even less likely to be the subject of a legal challenge 
in and of themselves. While there do not seem to be concrete examples of 
systemic impropriety of RCS awards or abuse of RCSs, a low frequency of 
judicial review of RCSs in general certainly raises such concern. Notably, this 
concern is further exacerbated where the agencies that administer RCS 
regimes are subject to a risk of capture, which in turn might even increase the 
risk of RCSs being improperly awarded or abused.85  
The natural result is that, for both good and bad, RCSs are widely 
considered a potent benefit for their recipients. This potency lends itself to a 
highly predictable business environment, thereby encouraging reliance on 
RCSs by their beneficiaries.86 In practical terms, RCS-beneficiaries can expect 
                                                                                                                     
  At least part of the explanation for the relatively high overturning rate of agency 
decisions involving the 180-day generic exclusivity RCS instituted under the Hatch-
Waxman Act may be attributable to objective difficulty in administering the relevant 
statutory language, which courts have described as “far from a model of legislative 
draftsmanship,” “cumbersome,” and “very confusing and ambiguous.” See Mova Pharm. 
Corp. v. Shalala, 140 F.3d 1060, 1069 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citations omitted). 
 84 The number of reported cases addressing issues that directly pertain to RCSs is 
dwarfed when compared, for example, with the number of reported patent lawsuits, which 
measure in the thousands each year. The number of patent cases reported in Westlaw, for 
instance, for the years 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011 and 2012 is, respectively, 2103, 2126, 2097, 
2098, and 2314 for each of those years. Westlaw search conducted Mar. 14, 2015.  
 85 Regulatory or agency capture occurs when a regulatory body or agency created to 
regulate certain industries or sectors in the public’s interest instead advances the 
commercial or special interests of the industries or sectors it is charged with regulating. 
Thomas W. Merrill, Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967–1983, 72 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 
1039, 1060–62 (1997). 
 86 See, e.g., BIOTECH. INDUS. ORG. (BIO), A FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGICS REGIME 
WITHOUT STRONG DATA EXCLUSIVITY WILL STIFLE THE DEVELOPMENT OF NEW MEDICINES 
4, available at https://www.bio.org/sites/default/files/FOBMarketExclusivity_ 
050307_0.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/S59R-P77J (“[A] 14-year period of data 
exclusivity serves essentially as an insurance policy that provides the innovator with some 
certainty of protection . . . .”); Henry Grabowski, Genia Long & Richard Mortimer, Data 
Exclusivity Periods for Biologics: Updating Prior Analyses and Responding to Critiques 4 
(Duke Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2008-10, 2008), available at 
http://public.econ.duke.edu/Papers/PDF/Data_Exclusivity_Periods_for_Biologics.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/C7FA-FN85 (arguing that the purpose of the market exclusivity 
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to reap the full benefits that are the result of their respective RCSs unless one 
of two unlikely events occurs: (1) the RCS benefitting them is found to be 
based on fraud, or (2) the agency decision that triggered the RCS is declared 
outright illegal under the exacting standard of the Administrative Procedure 
Act.87 
3. Specificity 
Because they are a byproduct of agency regulation, RCSs are by their 
nature “tailor-made” for particular areas of regulation, industries, or 
technology.88 This specificity, in turn, makes RCSs highly variable in (1) their 
length, (2) their triggering events, and (3) their effects, which are dependent on 
the regulatory powers of the agency that administers each RCS.89 
4. Flexibility 
The fact that each and every RCS regime is “tailor-made” also makes 
RCSs highly flexible both as a regulatory tool and as an instrument of public 
policy. When establishing RCS regimes, legislators and policymakers are able 
to craft RCSs in a manner aimed at achieving a wide range of goals by 
controlling the variables characterizing RCSs.90 Primarily, these variables are 
the length of the RCS, its triggering event, and the nature of the competitive 
shelter created.91 Additional variables may include the renewability of the 
                                                                                                                     
for biological product developers is to provide them “with an ‘insurance policy’ against the 
potential failings of patent protection for biologics”); Henry Grabowski & Joseph DiMasi, 
Biosimilars, Data Exclusivity, and the Incentives for Innovation: A Critique of Kotlikoff’s 
White Paper 4–8 (Duke Univ. Dep’t of Econ., Working Paper No. 2009-02, 2009), 
available at http://public.econ.duke.edu/Papers//PDF/FinalDraft2_5_09.pdf, archived at 
http://perma.cc/9EGX-ZFP9 (“[F]rom the standpoint of innovative firms, [regulatory 
competitive shelter] protection provides a back-up or insurance policy to the patent 
system.”). 
 87 See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012) (directing reviewing courts to hold unlawful and 
set aside actions that are “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in 
accordance with the law”). 
 88 This is, possibly, the reason for the fact that, to date, RCSs have not been discussed 
as such, but rather, almost always, in the particular context of their specific regulatory 
framework and technological contexts. 
 89 A possible explanation for the specificity of RCSs is that they are tailored not only 
to particular regulatory frameworks, industries, or technologies but also are designed so as 
to facilitate the creation of follow-on versions of the original product, which are expected 
to be as close as possible to the original product. In other words, RCSs must be specific 
because they are made to facilitate imitations of highly specific products.  
 90 See Eisenberg 2012, supra note 14, at 184.  
 91 This flexibility stands in sharp contrast to the rigidity of the patent system and the 
tremendous difficulties involved in making changes to it. See Thomas, supra note 14, at 
370–71 (contrasting the ease of changing RCS regimes to the difficulties involved in 
making changes to the patent system).  
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RCS (namely, the ability to re-trigger the RCS term), the RCS being subject to 
particular review and appeal mechanisms (including judicial review), and 
more. 
5. Clear Boundaries 
Owing to their high level of specificity, the nature and extent of the 
benefits conferred by RCSs are usually very clear.92 Thus, beneficiaries of 
RCSs usually know with a high level of certainty what is covered by the RCS 
(usually a specific product), for how long, and against whom or under what 
circumstances. Such clarity stands in sharp contrast to uncertainties that 
surround other regulatory benefits and exclusivities. The most obvious 
example of a regulatory exclusivity riddled with such uncertainties is patents, 
whose scope, length, and even validity are often the topic of disagreement and 
dispute among courts.93 The clarity of the benefits conferred by RCSs, in turn, 
promotes legal certainty, which further increases the value of RCSs to business 
entities. 
6. Low Risk of Imposing Impediments to R&D 
Because RCSs mostly relate to products, rather than to the underlying 
technologies present in such products (as with patents), RCSs in and of 
themselves do not preclude research involving the approved product 
(downstream) or the underlying technology in the product (upstream). Rather, 
RCSs only impair one’s ability to compete with a previously-approved product 
that is the subject of an RCS.94 In this respect, RCSs are unlike patents, which 
provide a very limited ability to conduct research involving the patented 
technology in general and outside of the context of FDA filings in particular.95 
                                                                                                                     
 92 This is not to say that the onset of any specific RCS is known, as in most cases 
administrative agencies do not publicize the fact that an RCS has been triggered. A notable 
exception to this general rule is the FDA’s Orange Book, which includes notice of existing 
RCSs pertaining to pharmaceutical products. See Orange Book: Approved Drug Products 
with Therapeutic Equivalence, FDA, http://www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cder/ob/ 
default.cfm (last updated May 17, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/WEC2-RNTN.  
 93 The best example of such disagreement is evident from the high reversal rate of 
district courts’ claim construction decisions by the Federal Circuit. See Kimberly A. 
Moore, Markman Eight Years Later: Is Claim Construction More Predictable?, 9 LEWIS & 
CLARK L. REV. 231, 233 (2005) (finding a reversal rate of 34.5% for appealed claim terms 
from 1996 through 2003). See generally BESSEN & MEURER, supra note 11.  
 94 See Gregory Dolin, Exclusivity Without Patents: The New Frontier of FDA 
Regulation for Genetic Materials, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1399, 1406–07 (2013) (recognizing this 
characteristic in the context of market exclusivities).  
 95 While patent law does include a common law experimental use defense for patent 
infringement, the Federal Circuit has practically construed this defense out of existence. 
See Madey v. Duke Univ., 307 F.3d 1351, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (citations omitted) 
(holding that, so long as the act is in furtherance of the alleged infringer’s business and is 
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7. Low Administrative Cost 
As noted by Professor Aaron S. Kesselheim, RCSs “are politically 
attractive because they offer support for . . . innovation without direct 
allocation of taxpayer funds.”96 While legislators and policymakers are 
reluctant generally to pass legislation that requires further expenditures of 
public funds, RCSs tend to generate no such objections. This may be because 
RCSs are perceived as “byproducts” of established regulatory mechanisms 
whose administration (by “tacking them on” to the independently existing 
regulatory regime) requires no further resources on top of those already spent 
to administer the regime.  
Regardless of the accuracy of this perception,97 the administration of RCS 
regimes as such seems to require relatively little investment of funds.98 First, 
as byproducts of existing regulatory mechanisms that are already in place and 
funded, little to no additional costs are required in order to create RCSs.99 By 
contrast, other regulatory exclusivities, such as patents, do typically require 
investment of funds necessary for evaluation of applications and the creation 
of a mechanism for awarding any implicated rights.100 Second, because RCSs 
are relatively unsusceptible to legal challenges, presumably, administrative 
                                                                                                                     
not solely “for amusement, to satisfy idle curiosity, or for strictly philosophical inquiry,” 
the act does not qualify for the experimental use defense). A notable exception to this 
exists where the research activities are done “solely for uses reasonably related to the 
development and submission of information under a Federal law which regulates the 
manufacture, use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.” 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) 
(2012).  
 96 Aaron S. Kesselheim, Using Market-Exclusivity Incentives to Promote 
Pharmaceutical Innovation, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1855, 1855 (2010) [hereinafter 
Kesselheim 2010].  
 97 This perception is not necessarily fully grounded in economic reality. For example, 
the Congressional Budget Office estimated that market exclusivity provisions in a recently 
instituted RCS regime would cause significant direct expenditures over the following 
decade. See CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, COST ESTIMATE, H.R. 5651: FOOD AND 
DRUG ADMINISTRATION REFORM ACT OF 2012, at 8 (2012).  
 98 These assumptions do not apply, of course, if an entire regulatory framework is 
instituted for the sake of establishing an RCS regime. While the author is not aware of an 
example of such a case, should this occur, the cost of administering the RCS should be 
viewed as the cost of administering the regulatory framework.  
 99 On the other hand, RCSs may also be viewed as a regulatory mechanism to avoid 
raising taxes in order to fund the development of technology and, instead, rolling over the 
costs of development of new technology to the public via the high prices charged by RCS-
beneficiaries for their products.  
 100 To illustrate, the budgetary requirements of the USPTO for its patent-related 
activities in the fiscal year 2015 were about $2.9 billion. See U.S. PATENT & TRADEMARK 
OFFICE, FISCAL YEAR 2015 PRESIDENT’S BUDGET: THE USPTO CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET 
JUSTIFICATION 15 Fig. 2 (2014), available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplan/ 
budget/fy15pbr.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/AA96-83NV.  
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agencies only need to litigate their decisions involving RCSs infrequently and 
their expenditure on such litigation is relatively low.101 
III. A SURVEY OF FEDERAL REGULATORY COMPETITIVE SHELTER 
REGIMES 
To date, federal law establishes eight different RCS regimes and fifteen 
specific RCSs listed in Table 3 below.102 This part reviews these regimes.  
 
                                                                                                                     
 101 Most litigation involving RCSs typically does not involve a direct challenge of the 
RCS but rather of the decision of the administering agency that gave rise to the RCS or 
some ancillary aspect thereof. See supra note 83.  
 102 The author is not aware of additional freestanding RCS regimes instituted under 
federal law.  
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Table 3: RCS Regimes Established to Date 
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A. Regulatory Competitive Shelters in Pesticides  
Although the best-known RCS regime is probably the one instituted under 
the Hatch-Waxman Act,103 the first RCS instituted by Congress was created 
by amendments made to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide 
Act (FIFRA)104 in the Federal Pesticide Act of 1978.105 Under the FIFRA 
amendments, pesticides must be registered with the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) prior to their sale in interstate commerce.106 Receiving 
approval under FIFRA typically requires submission of data to the EPA to 
demonstrate the safety of the particular pesticide compound.107 The 1978 
amendments to FIFRA created a ten-year exclusivity period, which could be 
waived at will, for data submitted by manufacturers of pesticide products 
where the data pertains to a new active ingredient or a new use of a known 
ingredient.108 This ten-year data exclusivity period is then followed by an 
additional five-year mandatory compensation period, during which the EPA 
may consider previously submitted data “only if the [secondary] applicant has 
made an offer to compensate the original data submitter . . . .”109 After 
expiration of the five-year mandatory licensing/compensation period, the data 
becomes freely available for use in follow-on applications without any need to 
receive the permission of the original data submitter or offer compensation for 
the data.110  
In other words, under the RCS regime instituted by the 1978 amendments 
to FIFRA, a follow-on applicant (M2) for a version of a pesticide product 
previously approved (P1) by the EPA (AA) seeking to rely on information (D) 
submitted as part of an application for the approval of the original pesticide 
product for the approval of its own follow-on product (P2) is unable to do so 
for a period of ten years (T=10 years) without the prior approval of the original 
manufacturer and data submitter (M1).111 This ten-year data exclusivity period 
                                                                                                                     
 103 See infra Part III.C.  
 104 Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), ch. 125, 61 Stat. 163 
(1947) (codified as amended at 7 U.S.C. §§ 136–136w-8 (2012)).  
 105 Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (codified at 7 
U.S.C. §§ 136–136w-8).  
 106 7 U.S.C. § 136a(a).  
 107 Id. In the context of FIFRA, safety is defined as the lack of “unreasonable adverse 
effects on the environment.” 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb).  
 108 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(i); see also ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF PESTICIDE 
PROGRAMS, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS–EXCLUSIVE USE DATA PROTECTION FOR MINOR 
USE REGISTRATIONS 2 (2014), available at http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/minoruse/ 
exclusive-use-questions.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/BXM9-UMSM.  
 109 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iii). This subsection further creates an elaborate scheme 
for resolution of disputes regarding the amount of the compensation, including a 
mandatory arbitration between the parties in case of a dispute. Id. Notably, disagreement 
between the parties regarding the compensation will not delay registration by the EPA. Id.  
 110 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(iv).  
 111 See id. 
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is then followed by a five-year mandatory compensation/licensing period, 
which is not an RCS.112 Rather, the five-year mandatory 
compensation/licensing period constitutes a different mechanism for creating 
incentives for innovation, which complements the stricter (and more 
developer-favorable) RCS component of the FIFRA regime. 
In 1998, Congress added to the FIFRA RCS regime an option to extend 
the ten-year data exclusivity period by one year for every three new “minor 
uses” approved by the EPA for the original pesticide product.113 Notably, such 
extension is only available up to three times in each pesticide product (up to a 
total of thirteen years of data exclusivity) and cannot be granted for “minor 
uses” registered more than seven years after the onset of the ten-year data 
exclusivity period.114 Furthermore, FIFRA instructs the EPA to grant such 
one-year extensions only after consulting with the Secretary of Agriculture and 
subject to a determination that certain public policy considerations are 
applicable.115 
The history of the FIFRA RCS regime is long and complicated and 
exceeds the scope of this Article. However, being the first RCS regime on 
record, there are several interesting facets of the evolution of the FIFRA RCS 
regime that are worth describing. Originally, the 1947 version of FIFRA did 
not prohibit the disclosure of information relating to pesticide products.116 
During the early 1970s, several key processes and developments took place 
that would eventually result in the FIFRA RCS. Among these were the 
ongoing increased use of pesticides in agriculture and concerns about their 
potential harmful effects on human and animal health117 and the establishment 
                                                                                                                     
 112 See supra note 109.  
 113 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(ii). A “minor use” is defined as “the use of a 
pesticide . . . where[:] (1) the total United States acreage for the crop is less than 300,000 
acres . . . ; or (2) the [EPA], in consultation with the Secretary of Agriculture, determines 
that” there is insufficient economic incentive to apply for registration of the product for 
such use independently and one of four other public policy considerations is applicable. 7 
U.S.C. § 136(ll); see infra note 115.  
 114 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(ii). 
 115 These considerations are: “(I) there are insufficient efficacious alternative 
registered pesticides available for the use [in a particular crop]; (II) the alternatives to the 
minor use pesticide pose greater risks to the environment or human health; (III) the minor 
use pesticide plays or will play a significant part in managing pest resistance; or (IV) the 
minor use pesticide plays or will play a significant part in an integrated pest management 
program.” See 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F)(ii)(I)–(IV).  
 116 See Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 1014, 1016 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“As enacted in 1947, FIFRA did not specifically prohibit the USDA from publicly 
disclosing submitted data or from using data supplied by one applicant to determine 
whether to register a pesticide offered subsequently by another.”).  
 117 See Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Agric., 92d Cong. 170 (1971) (statement of W.B. Ennis, Jr., Chief of Crops Protection 
Research Breach, United States Department of Agriculture) (“Since 1940 we have 
witnessed agricultural changes . . . . This has come about primarily because of . . . (6) 
control of damaging weeds, diseases, insects, and other pests and parasites.”) 
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of the EPA and its charge with the administration of FIFRA instead of the 
Department of Agriculture.118 Another significant development was the 
amendment of FIFRA in 1972 so as to require a showing that pesticide 
products seeking registration would not “cause unreasonable adverse effects 
on the environment.”119 All of these factors resulted in heightened 
requirements for scientific data regarding pesticide products as a condition for 
registration by the EPA.120 This, in turn, imposed increased financial burdens 
on developers of pesticide products who were now required to invest 
substantial resources in complying with the EPA data requirements.121 As the 
heightened data requirements posed by the EPA under FIFRA increased 
financial burdens on developers of pesticide products, developers seem to have 
become less and less tolerant of certain EPA practices involving the disclosure 
and use of such data. 
Traceable back to the early days of the FIFRA RCS regime, the USDA, 
which was originally in charge of administering FIFRA, maintained the 
practice of using data submitted by original pesticide product developers in the 
review and approval of subsequent applications for registration of follow-on 
versions of such products.122 Concerned about free-riding by subsequent 
applicants, developers of original pesticide products sought to curb this 
practice or at least limit it in a manner that would minimize their exposure to 
financial loss owing to the sharing of data about their products. A heated 
public policy debate ensued, which epitomized all of the key features of 
similar debates surrounding later RCS regimes.123  
On one side of the debate were proponents of pesticide developers who 
advocated for stronger protection of data submitted to the EPA in connection 
                                                                                                                     
 118 See Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, 35 Fed. Reg. 15,623 (Oct. 6, 1970); Union 
Carbide, 632 F.2d at 1016 (“The United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) 
administered the registration program from 1947 until 1970, when EPA assumed that 
responsibility.”).  
 119 Federal Environmental Pesticide Control Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-516, 
§§ 3(c)(5)(C)–(D), 86 Stat. 973, 980–81.  
 120 See Union Carbide, 632 F.2d at 1016 (“This costly research and lengthy 
development process produce data that define the peculiar characteristics of the pesticide 
submitted for registration . . . [and] must be submitted to obtain registration.”). 
 121 Id.; Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on 
Agric., at 331 (statement of Richard H. Wellman, Vice President, Process Chemicals 
Division of Union Carbide Corporation) (arguing that newer and higher regulatory barriers 
were being placed in front of industry in their attempts to develop new pesticides and that 
the cost of developing the necessary data for an application in support of registration was 
heavy).  
 122 See Union Carbide, 632 F.2d at 1016 (“[I]t appears that the USDA made no public 
disclosures of data but did make use of data on hand in evaluating later applications.”).  
 123 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-663, at 41–42, 58 (1977) (describing a debate regarding 
the appropriate length, type, and purpose of proposed RCS regimes for FIFRA and the 
dispute surrounding the definition of proprietary data). 
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with applications for registration of pesticide products.124 The National 
Agriculture Chemical Association, for example, argued that by referring to 
data submitted in connection with an earlier application as part of its review of 
subsequent applications the EPA was undermining incentives for the 
development of new pesticides.125 Proponents of pesticide developers 
advocated for the institution of long RCSs during which the EPA would not be 
allowed to use previously submitted data, which—according to them—would 
prevent free-riding and provide additional incentive for R&D.126  
On the other side of the debate were those who advocated for little or no 
exclusivity in the data submitted to the EPA. Among them were proponents of 
public access to the information submitted to the EPA as well as those 
concerned over what they saw as a potentially wasteful and unjustified 
extension of monopolies in pesticide products via the institution of “quasi-
patents.”127  
The length of the FIFRA data exclusivity was a topic of particularly 
intense debate. While proponents of product developers strongly advocated for 
ten-year data exclusivity, their opponents objected to the institution of any 
exclusivity period or would accept, at most, a reasonable compensation 
requirement. Others preferred reaching a “middle-ground” comprised of five 
years of data exclusivity followed by an additional period of five years during 
which a compensation requirement would apply.128 However, as pointed out 
by the EPA during the legislative debate that preceded the enactment of the 
Federal Pesticide Act: 
[We] should be mindful . . . [that] neither approach has had a fair test of 
implementation . . . . It should be noted that EPA economists who analyzed 
the 7-year compensation period in S. 1678 determined that that period was 
sufficient to provide a return on the data investment commensurate with other 
expenditures by pesticide developers. If Congress wishes to confer a “bonus” 
reward to data developers, extending the compensation period to the point 
where the rewards equal those of the exclusive use period is an alternative 
that merits consideration.129 
                                                                                                                     
 124 Federal Pesticide Control Act of 1971: Hearings Before the H. Comm. on Agric., at 
331. 
 125 Id.  
 126 See H.R. REP. NO. 95-663, at 41 (reasoning provided by Rep. Thone for his 
proposal of a ten-year period of data exclusivity).  
 127 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-511, at 69, 72 (1971) (remarks of Reps. Foley & Dow); S. 
REP. NO. 92-970 at 12–13 (1972) (letter from the Attorney General); H.R. REP. NO. 95-663, 
at 41, 53–54 (1977) (reasoning provided by Rep. Fithian for his proposal to provide 
appropriate compensation in lieu of data exclusivity; letter from the EPA expressing 
preference for compensation of product developers for use of their data over exclusivity in 
such data).  
 128 See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 95-663, at 41–43, 58.  
 129 Id. at 53.  
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Indeed, the EPA’s polite use of deferential language—“[i]f Congress 
wishes to confer a ‘bonus’ reward,” etc.—barely excuses the fact that none of 
the positions taken up by the participants in the debate seem to have been 
founded on any reason-based calculation or empirical data.130 Unfortunately, 
this sad reality also characterized later RCS regimes. 
Eventually, in 1978, Congress amended FIFRA by enacting the Federal 
Pesticide Act of 1978 (FPA), which revised FIFRA’s data-consideration and 
data-disclosure provisions and instituted FIFRA’s RCS regime.131 Attempting 
to strike a balance between the various interests involved,132 a crucial part of 
these revisions was FPA’s authorization of the EPA to disclose health, safety, 
and environmental data to qualified requesters.133 Such disclosure was meant 
to take place regardless of whether the data may be classifiable as containing 
trade secrets, but excluding information that would reveal “manufacturing or 
quality control processes,” inert ingredients added to a product, and methods 
of testing or measuring their quantity unless the EPA has first determined that 
such disclosure “is necessary to protect against an unreasonable risk of injury 
to health or the environment.”134 Yet, this balance failed to satisfy developers 
of original pesticide products who challenged it as an unconstitutional taking 
of proprietary information without just compensation or due process of law.135 
The issue was eventually taken up by the Supreme Court, which held that the 
EPA’s consideration or disclosure of data submitted by an applicant to the 
agency prior to 1972 or after FPA did not constitute an unconstitutional 
taking.136 Specifically, the Supreme Court held that regardless of whether such 
data included trade secrets, 
with respect to any health, safety, and environmental data that [pesticide 
product developers] submit[] to EPA after the effective date of the 1978 
FIFRA amendments . . . [such developers can]not have . . . a reasonable, 
investment-backed expectation that EPA would keep the data confidential 
beyond the limits prescribed in the amended statute itself. [Such developers 
are] on notice of the manner in which EPA was authorized to use and disclose 
any data turned over to it by an applicant for registration. 
. . . If, despite the data-consideration and data-disclosure provisions in 
the statute, [a product developer chooses] to submit the requisite data in order 
to receive a registration, it can hardly argue that its reasonable investment-
                                                                                                                     
 130 Id. 
 131 Federal Pesticide Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-396, 92 Stat. 819 (codified at 7 
U.S.C. §§ 136–136w-8) (2012).  
 132 H.R. REP. NO. 95-663, at 42.  
 133 FIFRA §§ 10(d)(1)(A)–(C); 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d). 
 134 7 U.S.C. § 136h(d). 
 135 See Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co. v. Costle, 632 F.2d 1014, 1017 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(reversing a temporary restraining order against the implementation of the FPA); 
Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 987 (1984). 
 136 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 987. 
2015] REGULATORY COMPETITIVE SHELTERS 335 
 
backed expectations are disturbed when EPA acts to use or disclose the data 
in a manner that was authorized by law at the time of the submission.137 
The Supreme Court further emphasized that,  
such restrictions [as those included in the data sharing provisions] are the 
burdens we all must bear in exchange for ‘the advantage of living and doing 
business in a civilized community.’ . . . This is particularly true in an area, 
such as pesticide sale and use, that has long been the source of public concern 
and the subject of government regulation.  
. . . Thus, as long as [product developers are] aware of the conditions 
under which the data are submitted, and the conditions are rationally related 
to a legitimate Government interest, a voluntary submission of data by an 
applicant in exchange for the economic advantages of a registration can 
hardly be called a taking.”138 
As for data submitted to the EPA prior to the 1972 Amendments, which 
was allegedly subject to the general provisions of the federal Trade Secrets 
Act, and not subject to the 1972 FIFRA amendments that explicitly addressed 
such data,139 the Supreme Court held that, 
the Trade Secrets Act is not a guarantee of confidentiality to submitters of 
data, and, absent an express promise, [a product developer] had no 
reasonable, investment-backed expectation that its information would remain 
inviolate in the hands of EPA . . . . Thus, with respect to data submitted to 
EPA in connection with an application for registration prior to October 22, 
1972, the Trade Secrets Act provided no basis for a reasonable investment-
backed expectation that data submitted to EPA would remain confidential. 
A fortiori, the Trade Secrets Act cannot be construed as any sort of 
assurance against internal agency use of submitted data during consideration 
of the application of a subsequent applicant for registration.140 
Moreover, the Supreme Court ruled that even in cases in which the 
consideration of data by the EPA constitutes a taking, the use of such data by 
the EPA is still “public use” (and therefore permissible under the Fifth 
Amendment) because “[s]o long as the taking has a conceivable public 
character, ‘the means by which it will be attained is . . . for Congress to 
determine.’”141 Specifically, the Supreme Court ruled that,  
the public purpose behind the data-consideration provisions is clear from the 
legislative history. Congress believed that the provisions would eliminate 
costly duplication of research and streamline the registration process, making 
new end-use products available to consumers more quickly. Allowing 
applicants for registration, upon payment of compensation, to use data 
                                                                                                                     
 137 Id. at 1006–07.  
 138 Id. at 1007–08 (emphasis added).  
 139 See id. at 1009–14 (discussing data submitted between October 22, 1972, and 
September 30, 1978).  
 140 Id. at 1008–09.  
 141 Id. at 1014 (citations omitted).  
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already accumulated by others, rather than forcing them to go through the 
time-consuming process of repeating the research, would eliminate a 
significant barrier to entry into the pesticide market, thereby allowing greater 
competition among producers of end-use products.142 
As mentioned earlier, many of the issues raised during the deliberations 
and debates that surrounded the institution of the FIFRA RCS regime are the 
same as those that accompany—some would say plague—RCS regimes and 
the debates surrounding them to this day. Indeed, many of the issues raised in 
the context of FIFRA seem to be a staple of regulatory exclusivity regimes in 
general, including RCSs.  
According to the EPA’s Pesticide Product Information System (PPIS), the 
EPA has registered over 95,000 pesticide products under FIFRA.143 
B. Regulatory Competitive Shelters Under the Orphan Drug Act 
The first of several RCS regimes in the area of pharmaceutical 
technologies, enacted in 1983, the Orphan Drug Act (ODA)144 institutes a 
regime of market exclusivities for developers of drugs for rare diseases.145 
Under the ODA, once a pharmaceutical is approved for marketing and 
“designated under [21 U.S.C. § 360bb] for a rare disease or condition, the 
[FDA] may not approve another application . . . for such drug for such disease 
or condition for a [generic applicant] until the expiration of seven years from 
the date of the approval of the [drug or biologic].”146 The seven-year 
exclusivity period under the ODA may be further extended by six months for 
submission of clinical data involving studies of an orphan drug in the pediatric 
population.147  
Importantly, the ODA also gives the FDA the authority to effectively 
rescind the exclusivity in a pharmaceutical product that received orphan drug 
status by approving another application for the marketing of the same drug for 
the same rare disease.148 This authority, however, is only applicable in two 
                                                                                                                     
 142 Ruckelshaus, 467 U.S. at 1014–15.  
 143 Pesticide Product Information System (PPIS), Basic Registration Information, 
EPA, http://www.epa.gov/opp00001/PPISdata/ (last visited Dec. 2, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/K6B7-CH49.  
 144 See supra note 4.  
 145 See 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a)(2) (2012) (defining “rare disease or condition”). Some 
well-known examples of rare diseases are Huntington’s disease, amyotrophic lateral 
sclerosis (ALS) (Lou Gehrig’s disease), and Tourette syndrome. See Congressional 
Findings for the Orphan Drug Act, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/regulatoryinformation/ 
legislation/federalfooddrugandcosmeticactfdcact/significantamendmentstothefdcact/orphan
drugact/default.htm (last updated July 18, 2013), archived at http://perma.cc/4XWY-P4MJ. 
 146 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(a)(2) (2012). To clarify, third parties would still be able to have 
the same pharmaceutical approved during the seven-year exclusivity period for a condition 
other than the rare disease.  
 147 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2012).  
 148 21 U.S.C. § 360cc(b).  
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situations: (1) when the original beneficiary of the seven-year exclusivity 
“cannot assure the availability of sufficient quantities of the drug to meet the 
needs of persons with the [rare disease]” and (2) where the beneficiary 
provides written consent to the approval of the subsequent application prior to 
the expiration of the seven-year exclusivity. Thus, the ODA provides a unique 
example of giving the administrative agency administering an RCS regime the 
power to cancel or rescind the exclusivity where the exclusivity jeopardizes 
the regime’s underlying public policy goals (in the first case) or where it is 
efficient to do so (in the second case).149  
As is evident from the definition of “rare disease or condition” under the 
ODA, the rationale behind the legislation of the Act was to create additional 
financial incentives for the development of drugs for rare diseases where 
patent law provided insufficient incentives to make the development of such 
pharmaceuticals financially feasible.150 At its inception, the ODA required 
that, in order to qualify for the seven-year market exclusivity, the underlying 
technology in the pharmaceutical product must be unpatented and 
unpatentable.151 The reason for this prerequisite was the original perception 
that where patents are available, they afford sufficient competitive advantages 
to make the R&D investment in the orphan pharmaceutical worthwhile. Yet, 
this non-patentability prerequisite was quickly discarded so as to make all 
pharmaceutical products—regardless of their status under the Patent Act—
potential candidates for the seven-year exclusivity.152 This change was meant 
“to protect [a] company that developed an orphan drug whose patent had 
expired or would expire by the time the drug could be tested and approved for 
use in a rare disease.”153 Therefore, “[u]nder the 1985 amendment, the seven 
year period of market exclusivity would continue to run concurrently with any 
remaining patent, so the exclusivity only benefits those drugs with little or no 
patent protection.”154 
                                                                                                                     
 149 FDA regulations implementing the ODA include another exception to the market 
exclusivity provision in cases where the follow-on drug is “clinically superior” to the drug 
under exclusivity. See 21 C.F.R. § 316.3(b)(14)(i) (2014).  
 150 See Congressional Findings for the Orphan Drug Act, supra note 145. Under the 
1983 Act, an orphan drug was defined as one for which there was “no reasonable 
expectation that the cost of developing . . . will be recovered from sales . . . of such drug.” 
Pub. L. No. 97-414, § 526(a)(2), 96 Stat. 2049 (1983) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360bb(a)(2) (2012)). The definition was later changed so as to also include “any disease 
or condition which . . . affects less than 200,000 persons in the United States.” 21 U.S.C. 
§ 360bb(a)(2). Orphan drug products may be entirely unpatentable and could still merit 
exclusivity under the ODA. 21 U.S.C. § 360bb(a). 
 151 ODA § 527. 
 152 See Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-91, § 2, 99 Stat. 387.  
 153 H.R. REP. NO. 100-473, at 5 (1987); H.R. REP. NO. 99-153, at 3–5 (1985) 
(describing situations where the non-patentability requirement interferes with the ODA’s 
purpose).  
 154 H.R. REP. NO. 100-473, at 5.  
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The seven-year RCS that is the crux of the ODA is considered to have 
been successful in achieving its desired effect—since its passage in 1983, 
more than 350 drugs and biologics155 for rare diseases and conditions have 
been brought into the market as compared with fewer than ten in the decade 
preceding the passage of the Act.156 Yet, despite its apparent success, the ODA 
and its RCS regime have often been criticized for fostering abusive 
commercial and competitive practices, including charging egregious prices for 
some orphan drugs.157 Many amendments have been proposed to the ODA 
over the years to address some of these concerns, but most of them have been 
rejected for fear of interfering with the Act’s perceived success.158 Most 
notably, in 1990 President George H.W. Bush vetoed an amendment to the 
ODA159 that would have made it possible for the FDA to rescind the market 
exclusivity under the statute if the patient population for the drug went above 
200,000 people,160 as well as to grant the seven-year exclusivity jointly to 
more than one party.161  
                                                                                                                     
 155 “Biologics” and “drugs” are both classes of pharmaceuticals. For simplicity, 
“biologics” and “biological products” are pharmaceutical products whose manufacturing 
involves the use of living organisms and are relatively large and complex molecules 
whereas “small molecule drugs” (or “drugs” for short), are chemically synthesized and are 
relatively small and simple. For further discussion of the differences between biologics and 
drugs, see Heled, supra note 13, at 421 n.2. 
 156 See Kesselheim 2010, supra note 96, at 1857 (“Many have hailed the act’s 
success.”); Frank R. Lichtenberg & Joel Waldfogel, Does Misery Love Company? 
Evidence from Pharmaceutical Markets Before and After the Orphan Drug Act, 15 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 335, 348 (2009) (arguing that the Orphan Drug Act “works”); 
Li-Hsien Rin-Laures & Diane Janofsky, Recent Developments Concerning the Orphan 
Drug Act, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 269, 270 (1991) (“There is little dispute that the Orphan 
Drug Act has been successful.”); FDA, DEVELOPING PRODUCTS FOR RARE DISEASES & 
CONDITIONS, http://www.fda.gov/forindustry/developingproductsforrarediseasesconditions/ 
default.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/2NSV-MZYE. 
 157 See, e.g., S. REP. NO. 102-358, at 2–8 (1992) (discussing some allegedly abusive 
commercial practices); 134 CONG. REC. S3685, 3686 (1988) (statement of Sen. 
Kassebaum); 134 CONG. REC. H1018, 1019 (1988) (statement of Rep. Waxman); see also 
Aaron S. Kesselheim et al., Characteristics of Clinical Trials to Support Approval of 
Orphan vs Nonorphan Drugs for Cancer, 305 JAMA 2320, 2325–26 (2011) (finding that 
pivotal trials for orphan drugs for cancer approved between 2004 and 2010 were more 
likely to be smaller and to use nonrandomized, unblinded trial designs and surrogate end 
points to assess efficacy than trials for non-orphan drugs). 
 158 See Gary Pulsinelli, The Orphan Drug Act: What’s Right with It, 15 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 299, 332, 334–35 (1999) (discussing the rejection of certain 
proposed amendments to the Orphan Drug Act); S. REP. NO. 103-366, at 14–16 (1994). 
 159 See 137 CONG. REC. H116, 116–17 (1991); H.R. REP. NO. 101-635 (1990). 
 160 H.R. REP. NO. 101-635, at 4. This proposal was meant to prevent abuses resulting 
from an orphan drug becoming a “blockbuster.” 
 161 137 CONG. REC. H116, 116–17. The “shared exclusivity” proposal was meant to 
alleviate some of the ramifications of situations where two or more developers race to 
obtain FDA approval for the same product, with the inevitable result being that one of them 
loses the race and its substantial investment in R&D. Id.; H.R. REP. NO. 101-635, at 4–5. 
2015] REGULATORY COMPETITIVE SHELTERS 339 
 
Interestingly, the legislative history of the ODA does not include any 
discussion of the length of the RCS instituted under the Act.162 Hence, as with 
the length of the FIFRA RCS, it appears that the determination of seven years 
as the period of RCSs granted under the ODA was not based on any traceable 
or verifiable criteria or at least none that is available on the public record. 
C. Regulatory Competitive Shelters Under the Hatch-Waxman Act 
Well known, widely used, and broadly considered a success story,163 the 
RCS regime under the Hatch-Waxman Act is, for better and for worse, the 
most prominent example of an RCS regime.164 The Hatch-Waxman Act 
creates a regulatory pathway for the approval of generic versions of small-
molecule drugs and establishes three exclusivity periods.165 First, the Hatch-
Waxman Act offers original drug manufacturers a five-year RCS period for 
receiving marketing approval of drugs containing therapeutic chemical 
compounds—new chemical entities (NCEs)—that have not been previously 
approved for medical use.166 During that period the FDA will not accept 
applications for generic versions of the drug product containing the new 
chemical compound.167 Akin to the RCS established under the Orphan Drug 
                                                                                                                     
 162 The legislative history of the Orphan Drug Amendments of 1985 includes a cursory 
reference to this issue. See H.R. REP. NO. 99-153, at 6 (1985) (“The Committee selected the 
period of seven years in current law because that period was thought to be a sufficient time 
to enable a drug company to recoup a significant amount, if not all, of the cost of 
development for many orphan drugs.”).  
  The seven-year period may bear some tangential relation to a perception recited 
frequently around the early 1980s regarding the loss of seven to ten years of patent 
protection owing to the lengthy approval proceedings at the FDA. See generally The Patent 
Term Restoration Act of 1981: Hearing on S. 255 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 
97th Cong. (1981) (discussing the perceived loss of patent protection due to the extension 
of regulatory approval processes of pharmaceuticals). This reasoning, however, has not 
been directly proposed with relation to the ODA’s seven-year RCS. 
 163 See supra note 11; see infra note 173 and accompanying text.  
 164 See supra note 5. For an overview of the Hatch-Waxman Act and its legislative 
history, see generally Mossinghoff, supra note 62; THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE 
DRUG PRICE COMPETITION AND PATENT TERM RESTORATION ACT OF 1984 (Allan M. Fox & 
Alan R. Bennett eds., 1987) [hereinafter FOX & BENNETT]. 
 165 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(j)(5)(F)(ii)–(iv), 355a(a)–(c) (2012).  
 166 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(ii). 
 167 See id. This exclusivity period is commonly known as “new chemical entity” 
(NCE) exclusivity. Id. However, a generic applicant may file an application for the 
approval of a generic version of the drug after four years by challenging the patents related 
to the original product under 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II), thereby effectively 
shortening the market exclusivity period under the NCE exclusivity to four years while, at 
the same time, “transforming” it into a data exclusivity. Such a challenge would normally 
prompt the filing of a lawsuit by the patent owner, which would trigger—regardless of the 
timing of the challenge with relation to the NCE exclusivity—an additional period of thirty 
months (or 7.5 years from the date of approval, if the filing was made between NCE years 
four and five) during which the FDA may not approve the generic application. See 21 
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Act, the purpose of the NCE exclusivity is to offer drug developers additional 
financial incentives to develop drugs where patent law provides insufficient 
incentives to make the development of such drugs financially feasible.168  
Additionally, the Hatch-Waxman Act creates a three-year RCS period for 
conducting supplemental clinical investigations that lead to the approval of an 
existing drug for treatment of a new medical condition or disease; during that 
period the FDA will not approve applications for generic versions of the drug 
product for that new medical use.169 Like the NCE exclusivity, the three-year 
exclusivity period is meant not only to provide further incentives for 
investment in R&D where little or no patent protection is available in a certain 
drug, but also to provide incentives for further R&D of previously-approved 
drugs that may have additional medical uses.170  
Finally, the Hatch-Waxman Act seeks to provide incentives for the 
creation of generic versions of drugs by granting a 180-day exclusivity period 
to pharmaceutical companies that are the first to file applications for the 
marketing of generic versions of an original drug product.171 In order to 
receive the 180-day exclusivity, however, a generic applicant must challenge 
patents related to the original drug as invalid, unenforceable, or not 
infringed.172 The flourishing generic drug market and the generic drug 
industry are commonly viewed as attributable to this RCS scheme created 
under the Hatch-Waxman Act.173 
                                                                                                                     
U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iii). Notably, the specific circumstances of the NCE exclusivity are 
such that in practice it typically lends itself to a 5.5 to 7.5-year market exclusivity period in 
the protected compound. Eisenberg 2012, supra note 14, at 185.  
 168 For the idea behind the NCE exclusivity established under the Hatch-Waxman Act, 
see FOX & BENNETT, supra note 164, at 60 (“The original Waxman Committee 
version . . . would have allowed granting four years of [product] exclusivity only to new 
chemical entities that for technical or scientific reasons are unpatentable.”); 130 CONG. 
REC. 24,425 (1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman) (“[T]he amendment provides a 5-
year period of exclusive market life for drugs approved for the first time after enactment of 
the legislation. This provision will give the drug industry the incentives needed to develop 
new chemical entities whose therapeutic usefulness is discovered late when little or no 
patent life remains.”). 
 169 See 21 U.S.C. §§ 355(c)(3)(E)(iii)–(iv) (2012).  
 170 See 130 CONG. REC. 24,425 (1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman) (“This 
provision will encourage drugmakers to obtain FDA approval for significant therapeutic 
uses of previously approved drugs.”). 
 171 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv). The benefit embodied in the 180-day exclusivity 
period for generic manufacturers lies in the recipient’s ability to charge near monopoly 
prices for its generic version of the drug for the duration of the 180-day exclusivity period. 
See Gitter, supra note 13, at 573 (noting that during the 180-day period the generic drug 
“shares duopoly prices with the Brand-name drug”). 
 172 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(B)(iv)(II). Thus, the Hatch-Waxman Act itself provides 
incentives to challenge patents related to the original drug product. In this respect, the 
Hatch-Waxman Act seeks to abolish one monopoly by offering another, shorter one. 
 173 The Hatch-Waxman Act is considered a great success in terms of providing 
incentives for R&D activities in monetary terms due to the savings attributable to the 
2015] REGULATORY COMPETITIVE SHELTERS 341 
 
Originally, the Hatch-Waxman Act included an additional ten-year RCS 
for drugs containing new chemical entities that were approved between 
January 1, 1982, and September 24, 1984.174 As is evident from these dates, 
this RCS is no longer applicable.  
Despite its success, the RCS regime instituted under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act has been the subject of much critique. While reviewing the ongoing debate 
regarding the Hatch-Waxman RCS regime exceeds the scope of this Article, it 
is worth mentioning some of the most prominent criticisms that have 
accompanied the Hatch-Waxman RCS regime since its inception. For one, the 
Hatch-Waxman RCSs have been accused of perverting the patent system by 
affording exclusive rights in technologies that would have otherwise not 
merited such rights under patent laws and by creating very powerful rights—
“super patents” of sorts—in such technologies that are unchallengeable.175 
Further, some of the Hatch-Waxman RCSs have also been accused of being 
“gifts” for the pharmaceutical industry at the expense of the public, which 
allows pharmaceutical companies to charge egregious prices for drugs, 
sometimes of little innovative value, for prolonged periods of time.176 In 
addition, the Hatch-Waxman RCS regime and its complex relation with patent 
laws have often been cited as creating an opening for various types of abuse, 
including through such infamous practices as “evergreening”177 and reverse-
                                                                                                                     
approval of generic versions of innovative drugs. See Gitter, supra note 13, at 586–87 
(reviewing the reasons for what the author describes as the overall success of the Hatch-
Waxman Act); Liang, supra note 41, at 365 (arguing that the Hatch-Waxman Act has been 
very successful in bringing cheaper generic versions of drugs to the market while 
maintaining incentives for continued innovation). 
 174 See 21 U.S.C. § 355(c)(3)(E)(i). This RCS was meant to serve as a transition 
regime, a “buffer” of sorts, between the virtually unlimited exclusivity in drugs that existed 
prior to the enactment of the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the onset of the pathway for the 
approval of follow-on drug products under the Act. See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 2, at 16 
(1984) (referring to the provision as an “interim rule” for the “transitional period” between 
January 1, 1982 and the date of enactment of the Hatch-Waxman bill).  
 175 See, e.g., 130 CONG. REC. 24,426 (1984) (statement of Rep. Kastenmeier). But see 
Morris supra note 11, at 269–70, 273 (arguing that the 180-day generic exclusivity is a 
perversion of the incentives for brand name companies to develop new drug products 
because by creating incentives to challenge patents covering such products it effectively 
reduces expected pharmaceutical patent life).  
 176 130 CONG. REC. 24,425 (1984) (statement of Rep. Henry Waxman). See also 
Jeremiah Helm, Comment, The Patent End Game: Evaluating Generic Entry into a 
Blockbuster Pharmaceutical Market in the Absence of FDA Incentives, 14 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 175, 195–96 (2007) (questioning the need for the 180-day 
generic exclusivity and suggesting that it does not serve its original purpose but rather 
propagates harmful pricing practices).  
 177 Evergreening—also euphemistically known as “life-cycle management”—is a term 
typically referring to a variety of practices of brand-name pharmaceutical manufacturers 
aimed at extending exclusivity periods for their products to maintain their revenue streams. 
See Aaron S. Kesselheim, Rising Health Care Costs and Life-Cycle Management in the 
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payment (a.k.a. “pay-for-delay”) arrangements.178 Finally, critics of the 
legislative process that resulted in the Hatch-Waxman Act have characterized 
it as “not the result of thoughtful consideration by committees or by Members 
of Congress; rather it is the byproduct of a backroom deal between two 
branches of the drug industry” resulting in “some significant, anticonsumer 
provisions.”179 
Another interesting aspect of the Hatch-Waxman RCSs is that, like the 
FIFRA and ODA RCSs, their length has no known verifiable rational basis.180 
Other equally consequential timeframes instituted under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act and relating to the patent term restoration component of the Act were 
“strictly arbitrary legislative numbers pulled out of the air.”181 It is not 
implausible that, like the patent term restoration timeframes, the lengths of the 
RCS timeframes under the Hatch-Waxman Act were also arbitrary or 
determined based on what the drafters believed would garner most political 
agreement rather than on any rational criteria. 
D. Regulatory Competitive Shelters in New Animal Drugs 
Enacted in 1988, the Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration 
Act (GADPTRA)182 created a RCS regime, which was modeled after the 
                                                                                                                     
Pharmaceutical Market, 10 PLOS MED. e1001461 (2013) (defining evergreening and 
listing examples of specific evergreening practices). Evergreening practices usually involve  
mak[ing] relatively minor changes to . . . existing products in order to restart their 
monopoly-protection clocks. These changes include changing the medication strength 
of pills[,] . . . changing the form of medication (e.g., switching from pill to capsule), 
modifying the method of delivery (e.g., from injection to inhalation), expanding 
indications (applying the medicine to additional conditions), pegylation (which has the 
effect of reducing doses per time period via time-release mechanisms), and 
glycosolation [sic] (adding sugar molecules to the medication).  
Kotlikoff, supra note 58, at 9; see also Eisenberg 2007, supra note 15, at 354.  
 178 See FTC v. Actavis, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2223, 2227 (2013) (addressing the legality of 
reverse payment arrangements); C. Scott Hemphill, Paying for Delay: Pharmaceutical 
Patent Settlements as a Regulatory Design Problem, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1553, 1559–60 
(2006); Hemphill & Lemley, supra note 15, at 949 (proposing changes to the 180-day 
generic exclusivity RCS regime); Kesselheim, supra note 11, at 490 (“In the case of Hatch-
Waxman, the 180-day exclusivity period has generated settlement agreements that benefit 
brand-name and generic drug manufacturers at the expense of patients and payers, by 
delaying the entry of generic drugs.”); Rumore, supra note 11, at 6 (describing pay-for-
delay arrangements and patent “evergreening” associated with the Hatch-Waxman Act).  
 179 130 CONG. REC. 24,426 (1984). 
 180 The legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act includes no discussion of the 
lengths of the RCSs instituted under the Act or any reference to how these lengths were 
determined.  
 181 See Mossinghoff, supra note 62, at 190.  
 182 Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 100-670, 102 
Stat. 3971 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
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Hatch-Waxman Act.183 GADPTRA creates a regulatory pathway for the 
approval of generic versions of drugs—albeit drugs meant for animals184—that 
includes: (1) a five-year exclusivity period for animal drugs containing 
therapeutic chemical compounds that have not been previously approved for 
medical use, during which the FDA will not accept applications for generic 
versions of an animal drug product containing the new chemical compound;185 
(2) a three-year RCS period for conducting supplemental clinical 
investigations that lead to the approval of a new medical use of a previously-
approved drug;186 and (3) a 180-day exclusivity period for companies that are 
first to file applications for the marketing of generic versions of an original 
animal drug product.187 Further, recognizing the difference in commercial 
value of animal drugs approved for use in non-food animals as opposed to 
food animals, under GADPTRA, the beneficiary of an NCE exclusivity may 
waive the five-year NCE exclusivity as it pertains to a non-food animal drug 
so as to regain it for the same chemical compound once it receives approval 
for use in food-animals; in such a case, the non-food animal drug would 
receive the three-year exclusivity discussed below.188 
The purpose of GADPTRA was:  
to extend to veterinary drugs . . . the generic competition and restored patent 
life afforded human pharmaceuticals by the [Hatch-Waxman] Act [and to 
follow] the same balance struck by Congress in 1984 in both fostering lower 
prices for generic products while restoring to innovators some of the patent 
                                                                                                                     
 183 See Animal Drug Amendments and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1986: Hearing 
on S. 2407 Before the S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res., 99th Cong. 2 (1986) 
[hereinafter S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res. 1986 Hearing].  
 184 See 21 U.S.C. § 360b(b)(2) (2012).  
 185 Id. § 360b(c)(2)(F)(i). As is the case under the Hatch-Waxman Act, a generic 
applicant may file an application for the approval of a generic version of the animal drug 
after four years by challenging the patents related to the original product, thereby 
effectively shortening the data-exclusivity period under the five-year exclusivity to four 
years. Id.  
 186 See id. § 360b(c)(2)(F)(ii)–(iii). 
 187 See id. § 360b(c)(2)(D)(iv). As with the generic product exclusivities under the 
Hatch-Waxman Act, in order to receive the 180-day exclusivity a generic applicant must 
challenge patents related to the original animal drug. See id. 
 188 21 U.S.C. §§ 360b(c)(2)(F)(iv)–(v); Drug Issues: Hearings Before the Subcomm. 
on Health and the Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 100th Cong. 
144 (1988) (“This provision recognizes that the scientific investigations necessary to gain 
approval for use in food-producing animals are ordinarily of greater length and of 
significantly greater cost than those for non-food producing animals.”). This provision was 
added to the proposed GADPTRA RCS regime at the explicit request of the 
pharmaceutical industry. See id. at 196, 209 (statement of the Animal Health Institute) 
(representing that “AHI is the national trade association [of the] major manufacturers of 
animal health products . . . veterinary drugs, and biologics[—]in the United States” and 
advocating for the inclusion of the RCS waiver option as it pertains to non-food animals).  
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protection lost primarily during Food and Drug Administration . . . review of 
premarket approval applications.189  
GADPTRA was met with the same critique as the Hatch-Waxman Act at 
its early stages.190 Interestingly, unlike the Hatch-Waxman Act, GADPTRA 
allows the FDA not only to use data submitted in connection with the review 
of earlier drug applications, but also to directly disclose such information to 
interested third parties, provided that such third parties commit not to disclose 
the data to unauthorized persons or use it for the purpose of marketing their 
products outside of the United States.191  
Unlike with all of the aforementioned pieces of legislation, the legislative 
history of GADPTRA does include a discussion, albeit brief, of the 
appropriate lengths of RCSs instituted under the Act.192 During a discussion of 
the version of the bill that was pending before the House of Representatives, 
two members of the House—Carlos Moorehead, member of the Subcommittee 
on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Administration of Justice of the House 
Committee on the Judiciary, and Thomas Tauke, a member of the House 
Committee on Energy and Commerce and one of the sponsors of the 
GADPTRA bill—had the following revealing exchange regarding the lengths 
of RCSs under the bill during Mr. Tauke’s testimony:  
Mr. MOORHEAD: . . . It takes a longer period of time for [animal drug 
products] to recover the costs of their research [than human drug products]. 
. . . You just do not give [animal drug developers] long enough to 
recover the costs of the research that they have put into this . . . . 
. . . [T]hat is my big concern about this thing. We just have not left a big 
enough [exclusivity] window for it. 
Mr. TAUKE: . . . So, now, what we are trying to figure out is what is an 
appropriate length of time. If you have additional ideas on what the length of 
time should be, perhaps you can attempt to offer those in the Subcommittee. 
I cannot sit here and say . . . I have all the wisdom to tell . . . precisely 
what the length of time should be. We think we have struck a reasonably 
good balance [in the GADPTRA bill]. 
. . . . 
Mr. MOORHEAD: . . . [I]t just seems to me we may be throwing a wet 
blanket on research if we do not allow a much larger [exclusivity] window 
than we have under this bill. 
Mr. TAUKE: . . . In my judgment, . . . the bill . . . strikes an appropriate 
balance . . . . 
But a year one way or another or something, probably that is not going to 
make that much difference. 
                                                                                                                     
 189 See S. REP. NO. 99-448, at 2 (1986).  
 190 See S. Comm. on Labor and Human Res. 1986 Hearing, supra note 183, at 35 
(statement of Dr. James Gillin, Chariman-Elect, Animal Health Institute). 
 191 See 21 U.S.C § 360b(p).  
 192 Generic Animal Drug and Patent Term Restoration Act: Hearing on H.R. 4982 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of Justice of the H. Comm. 
on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 88–89 (1988).  
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. . . . 
Obviously, in the human area [of drug research] we have struck the 
proper balance [with the Hatch-Waxman RCS regime] because research is at 
record levels.193 
Apparently, Congress recognized the significant differences between the 
human drug market and the animal drug market.194 Yet, the drafters of 
GADPTRA seem to have been unable to translate the differences between 
human and animal drugs into modifications of the lengths of the Hatch-
Waxman Act’s RCSs so as to adapt them to GADPTRA.195 
E. Regulatory Competitive Shelters for Additional Testing in Pediatric 
Populations Under the Food and Drug Administration Modernization 
Act 
In 1997, Congress passed the Food and Drug Administration 
Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), which instituted two separate RCS 
regimes.196 Under Section 111 of FDAMA, original drug manufacturers may 
extend an already existing RCS (e.g., under the Hatch-Waxman Act or Orphan 
Drug Act) by “tacking on” to these periods an additional term of six months of 
exclusivity197 for conducting clinical studies of the drug in pediatric 
populations.198 Further, if any patent listed in the FDA’s Orange Book covers 
                                                                                                                     
 193 Id. at 83–85.  
 194 Congress clearly recognized that there were profound differences in the regulatory 
and marketplace circumstances of human drugs and animal drugs. See, e.g., 134 CONG. 
REC. 29,036–37 (1988) (statement of Rep. Tauke); The Generic Animal Drug and Patent 
Term Restoration Act: Hearing on H.R. 5069 Before the Subcomm. on Health and the 
Environment of the H. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, 99th Cong. 69–70 (1986) 
(statement of the Animal Health Institute) (highlighting the differences between the testing 
requirements applicable to human drugs and animal drugs and stating that the provisions in 
“H.R. 5069 must be changed to reflect the realities of the animal drug marketing, rather 
than reflecting the human drug industry experience”). 
 195 This is evidenced by the wholesale incorporation of the Hatch-Waxman Act’s RCS 
terms into the GADPTRA regime. Cf. supra Part III.C.  
 196 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 (FDAMA), Pub. L. No. 
105-115, 111 Stat. 2296 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). For a discussion of 
the second regime instituted under FDAMA, see infra Part III.F.  
 197 The extension under FDAMA cannot stand alone when there is no prior exclusivity 
(RCS or patent) to “tack” it onto. This fact proved problematic later on, when it became 
evident that FDAMA did not create incentives for studies in pediatric populations where 
the six-month exclusivity would not apply. See S. REP. NO. 107-79, at 7–8 (2001) 
(discussing the need for the creation of a federal research fund for such studies).  
 198 21 U.S.C. § 355a (2012). To clarify, the exclusivity applies to the product in 
general and not just for its use in a pediatric population; in fact, the exclusivity may apply 
even if the product is eventually not approved for use in the pediatric population. The 
exclusivity, however, may not be “tacked on” if the existing RCS period (on which it is 
meant to be “tacked”) is set to expire in less than nine months. Id. §§ 355a(b)(2), (c)(2).  
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the drug,199 then the FDA may not approve any applications for follow-on 
versions of the drug during a period of six months subsequent to the expiration 
of such patents.200 
Commonly known as “pediatric exclusivity,” the purpose of this RCS is to 
encourage the collection of safety and efficacy information for drugs when 
used in the pediatric population so as to allow the “configuration” of existing 
pharmaceuticals for use in this population.201 The institution of the pediatric 
exclusivity RCS was a response to a neglect of pediatric populations in the 
ordinary course of clinical testing of new pharmaceutical products due to lack 
of financial incentives.202 Five years after its institution, in light of its apparent 
success in obtaining its desired effect,203 Congress reauthorized the pediatric 
exclusivity.204 Notably, the reauthorizing act also included the requirement 
that the FDA publish a summary of studies performed in the pediatric 
population, which were submitted to the FDA within six months of a change 
made to the pediatric labeling of the relevant drug.205 Later amendments 
instituted a mandatory requirement for studies of new drugs in pediatric 
populations—including the grant of authority to the FDA to require such 
studies retroactively206—and reauthorized the pediatric exclusivity.207  
                                                                                                                     
For the pediatric exclusivity RCS to be triggered, the RCS beneficiary must satisfactorily 
complete the additional clinical trials required by the FDA and submit the data within the 
timeframe designated by the FDA. See Id. §§ 355a(b)(1), (c)(1), (d)(3), (e)(1).  
 199 See Orange Book, supra note 92.  
 200 21 U.S.C. § 355a(b)(1)(B).  
 201 The institution of the pediatric exclusivity RCS was a response to a perceived lack 
of “systematic means for testing the safety and efficacy of drugs on [sic] the pediatric 
population.” S. REP. NO. 105-43, at 3 (1997).  
 202 Id. at 51 (citing the fact that less than twenty percent of the prescription 
medications on the United States market are approved for use in the pediatric population 
and labeled for pediatric use as a rationale for the need for the pediatric exclusivity RCS). 
 203 S. REP. NO. 107-79, at 4–5 (2001) (citing indications to the success of pediatric 
exclusivity in encouraging drug developers to conduct studies in pediatric populations). 
The pediatric exclusivity’s success seems to have been reaffirmed in a 2011 report of the 
United States Government Accountability Office (GAO) report. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-11-457, REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES: 
PEDIATRIC RESEARCH, PRODUCTS STUDIED UNDER TWO RELATED LAWS, BUT IMPROVED 
TRACKING NEEDED BY FDA (2011).  
 204 Best Pharmaceuticals for Children Act, Pub. L. No. 107-109, 115 Stat. 1408 (2002). 
 205 Id.  
 206 Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-155, 117 Stat. 1936 
(codified at 21 U.S.C. § 355c (2012)); Pediatric Research Equity Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 
110-85, 121 Stat. 866. When the pediatric exclusivity was first instituted, receiving the 
exclusivity required that the applicant conduct the studies in response to a written request 
by the FDA, whereas the applicant had the option to elect whether to respond to the FDA’s 
request or not. See 21 U.S.C. § 355a(d) (2012).  
 207 Food and Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-85, 
§§ 402, 502, 121 Stat. 823, 866, 867; Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation 
Act (FDASIA), Pub. L. No. 112-144, 126 Stat. 993 (2012).  
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Like all other RCSs, the pediatric exclusivity has not been free from 
controversy and critique. While most of the outspoken opponents of the 
pediatric exclusivity legislation seem to agree that some form of pediatric 
exclusivity is a good idea, they point out resulting waste and abuses.208 As can 
be expected, much of the critique goes to the issue of cost-effectiveness of the 
exclusivity, which is not surprising given that, like with most other RCSs, the 
legislative history of the legislation instituting the RCS (FDAMA) includes no 
discussion of the length of the exclusivity. 
F. Regulatory Competitive Shelters in Class III Medical Devices 
The second RCS regime instituted under FDAMA209 creates data 
exclusivity in data submitted to the FDA in connection with premarket 
approval applications (PMAs) for Class III medical devices.210 Under this 
RCS, in reviewing (PMAs) for follow-on versions of previously-approved 
Class III medical devices, the FDA may only use data submitted in connection 
with the earlier application “6 years after the [original developer’s] application 
has been approved.”211 Medical devices are not awarded market exclusivity in 
addition to this six-year exclusivity period.212 Thus, subsequent applicants 
                                                                                                                     
 208 These include: (1) the pediatric exclusivity’s lack of cost-effectiveness; (2) the fact 
that in its current form it tends to encourage studies mostly in highly profitable drugs for 
which the exclusivity constitutes a windfall, at the expense of the public; and (3) that the 
exclusivity is not dependent on results (in the form of labeling changes reflecting the 
results of the studies). See H.R. REP. NO. 107-227, at 56–58 (2001); 153 CONG. REC. 
S11831, 11837–38 (2007) (statement of Sen. Dodd).  
 209 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-115, 
111 Stat. 2296 (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.). 
 210 Class III of medical devices includes those devices that are purported or 
represented to be for a use in supporting or sustaining human life or for a use which is of 
substantial importance in preventing impairment of human health, or present a potential 
unreasonable risk of illness or injury, and that with respect to which there is insufficient 
information to determine that regulatory controls applicable to Class I and Class II devices 
would provide reasonable assurance of safety and effectiveness. 21 U.S.C. § 360c(a)(1)(C) 
(2012). As such, Class III is the most heavily regulated tier of medical devices under FDA 
regulations. Id. Receiving a premarket approval of a Class III medical device from the 
FDA is subject to extensive data submission requirements. See id. § 360e(c)(1). Examples 
of Class III medical devices include artificial hearts, atrial defibrillators, cochlear implants, 
pacemakers, certain detection kits for life threatening pathogens (e.g., hepatitis B, hepatitis 
C, Human Papillomavirus), knee prostheses, and more. See Product Classification, FDA, 
www.accessdata.fda.gov/scripts/cdrh/cfdocs/cfPCD/classification.cfm (last updated Feb. 9, 
2015), archived at http://perma.cc/BH7W-HH6; 21 C.F.R. §§ 870.5300, 870.3610, 
888.3480 (2014).  
 211 Food and Drug Administration Modernization Act of 1997 § 216 (codified at 21 
U.S.C § 360j(h)(4)(A) (2012)).  
 212 Apparently, the reason for the lack of market-exclusivity in this area of technology 
was Congress’s impression that the medical device industry was sufficiently strong “to 
prosper without the aid of anti-competitive rules.” See FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., GUIDANCE 
348 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 76:2 
 
seeking approval of their own versions of previously-approved medical 
devices may do so even prior to the lapse of six years from the date when the 
FDA approved the original device by submitting their own R&D data.   
There is a dearth of legislative history pertaining to this RCS—which 
came to be known as “the six-year rule”—as well as its rationale.213 However, 
the similarity of the data exclusivity instituted under the six-year rule to the 
RCSs mentioned earlier suggests that its purpose was also to reward the 
submission of clinical data regarding a particular kind of medical technology 
by sheltering the submitter, for a limited period of time, from competition in 
that technology. Additional insight as to the purpose of this RCS may be 
gleaned from the legislative history of the RCS regime that preceded the six-
year rule, which the six-year rule replaced.  
Prior to 1997, the marketing approval of medical devices was subject to a 
data exclusivity regime known as “the four-of-a-kind rule.”214 Under this rule, 
in reviewing a PMA for a follow-on version of a medical device, the FDA was 
only able to refer to data submitted in connection with an earlier PMA after the 
lapse of one year from the entry of the fourth medical device of the same kind 
into the market.215 Prior to the institution of the four-of-a-kind rule in 1990, 
the FDA was unable to refer to such earlier data, causing waste of R&D 
resources and unnecessary delays in making new medical device technologies 
available to the public.216 Thus, while it is not clear what prompted Congress 
to replace the four-of-a-kind rule with the six-year rule, it is evident from the 
legislative history of the four-of-a-kind rule that the rationale for the medical 
device RCS was to create a regime that would facilitate use of data submitted 
to the FDA so as to avoid unnecessary waste and hindered accessibility to 
medical devices. Presumably, the institution of the six-year RCS period was 
meant to offset or mitigate the financial loss to medical device developers due 
to the use of their proprietary data and to facilitate competition in the markets 
for their devices. There seems to be no literature evaluating the success of the 
six-year rule. 
                                                                                                                     
ON SECTION 216 OF THE FOOD AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997, 
at 5 (2000). 
 213 FDAMA § 216, which contains the six-year rule, passed in its original form and the 
only language in the legislative history pertaining to this section merely offers cursory 
description of the section. See H.R. REP. NO. 105-399, at 56 (1997). 
 214 See H.R. REP. NO. 101-808, at 6–7, 27–28 (1990); CONG. RESEARCH SERV., FOOD 
AND DRUG ADMINISTRATION MODERNIZATION ACT OF 1997—THE PROVISIONS 31 (1998).  
 215 H.R. REP. NO. 101-808, at 27–28.  
 216 Id. at 27. 
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G. Regulatory Competitive Shelters Under the Biologics Price 
Competition and Innovation Act (BPCIA) 
On March 21, 2010, Congress enacted BPCIA,217 which laid the 
foundation for a regulatory pathway for the approval of biological products218 
“biosimilar to”219 (and possibly “interchangeable with”220) approved 
biological products (“reference products”221).222 BPCIA institutes several 
RCSs, including a twelve-year market exclusivity period for original 
biologics223 and a four-year data exclusivity period for data submitted in 
support of the application for an original biologic.224 BPCIA further provides 
for a possible extension of the twelve-year market exclusivity and four-year 
data exclusivity (as well as the seven-year exclusivity for biological products 
benefitting from the RCS under the Orphan Drug Act) with an additional six-
month period for having the biological product tested and approved for use in 
pediatric populations.225 In addition, BPCIA establishes market exclusivity 
                                                                                                                     
 217 BPCIA was enacted as part of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. 
Biologics Price Competition and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 7001–7003, 124 
Stat. 119, 804–23 (2010).  
 218 See supra note 155.  
 219 Under BPCIA, the term “biosimilar” or “biosimilarity” means that “the biological 
product is highly similar to the reference product notwithstanding minor differences in 
clinically inactive components” and that “there are no clinically meaningful differences 
between the biological product and the reference product in terms of the safety, purity, and 
potency of the product.” See BPCIA § 7002(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(i)(2) (2012)). 
 220 Under BPCIA, the term “interchangeable” or “interchangeability” means that “the 
biological product may be substituted for the reference product without the intervention of 
the health care provider who prescribed the reference product.” See BPCIA § 7002(b) 
(codified at 42 U.S.C § 262(i)(3), (k)(4) (2012)). 
 221 Under BPCIA, a “reference product” is the biological product previously approved 
by the FDA under PHSA § 351(a) against which a generic biological product is evaluated 
in an application submitted under BPCIA. See BPCIA § 7002(b) (codified at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 262(i)(4) (2012)). The determination of interchangeability was designed to be the prize 
sought after by generic manufacturers of follow-on, generic versions of original biological 
products. Once made, the interchangeability determination facilitates the “interjection” of 
the generic product into the existing market for the original product and enables it to 
benefit from the reference product’s client base.  
 222 BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012)). BPCIA sets up numerous 
elaborate conditions and requirements for the establishment of biosimilarity to a reference 
product and interchangeability thereof. See id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(2)–(4) 
(2012)). 
 223 BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012)). Under this exclusivity, the 
FDA may not approve follow-on versions of a previously approved biologic until after 
twelve years from the date of approval of the reference product. Id.  
 224 Id. (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262). During this period, generic applicants may not 
submit applications for the approval of their versions of biologics biosimilar to reference 
products. 42 U.S.C. § 262(k)(7)(C). 
 225 BPCIA § 7002(g) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262(m) (2012)).  
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periods of twelve to forty-two months for a generic manufacturer of a first 
biological product approved as interchangeable with the reference product.226  
The enactment of BPCIA was preceded by a boisterous battle with 
proponents of the biotechnology industry on one side and advocates of the 
generic industry on the other.227 As a result, BPCIA has a rich background and 
legislative history that offer a unique peek at many facets of its RCS regime, 
including the length of BPCIA’s RCSs in general and that of the twelve-year 
market exclusivity in particular.  
While the BPCIA RCS regime was fashioned with the Hatch-Waxman 
RCS regime in mind, unlike Hatch-Waxman’s five-year NCE exclusivity, the 
twelve-year market exclusivity under BPCIA was not devised as an added 
incentive for product developers where patent protection is unavailable or 
where there is too little patent life remaining.228 Rather, the twelve-year 
exclusivity was vehemently lobbied for and crafted as a fallback option to 
patents, serving as “litigation insurance” in case of failure to enforce patents 
protecting biological products.229 The reason for the need for such “litigation 
insurance” was that biologics developers viewed patent law’s protections of 
their proprietary interests as inadequate.230 In other words, while the Hatch-
Waxman’s NCE exclusivity was meant to supplement patents, the twelve-year 
market exclusivity under BPCIA was designed to replace patents. The 
determination of the desired length of the market exclusivity as twelve years 
was based on product developers’ perception that “the effective patent life for 
pharmaceuticals—the time remaining following FDA approval—is 
approximately eleven to twelve years.”231 Thus, based on these assumptions, 
                                                                                                                     
 226 BPCIA § 7002(a) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 262 (2012)). The length of a market 
exclusivity period afforded to such a first generic manufacturer depends on several factors, 
including: (1) whether a patent infringement lawsuit was filed subsequent to the filing of 
the biosimilar application under 42 U.S.C. § 262(k) for the approval of a version of the 
original biological product; (2) the outcome of such lawsuit; and (3) the marketing status of 
such product. Id. 
 227 See Heled, supra note 13, at 437 & nn.69–70; see also H.R. 6257, 109th Cong. 
(2006) and S. 4016, 109th Cong. (2006) (introduced, respectively, by Rep. Waxman and 
Sen. Schumer as a way to “start the conversation” about a framework for the approval of 
generic versions of biologics); H.R. 1038, 110th Cong. (2007) (reintroduced version of 
H.R. 6257, 109th Cong. (2006)); S. 623, 110th Cong. (2007) (reintroduced version of 
S. 4016, 109th Cong. (2006)).  
 228 See supra note 168 and accompanying text.  
 229 Proponents of long product-exclusivity periods in biological products have 
described such exclusivity as an “insurance policy” in case patents would fail. See supra 
note 86.  
 230 See Heled, supra note 13, at 438 & n.74, 451 & n.142 (reviewing the arguments in 
favor of a long product-exclusivity period for biologics developers). 
 231 Gitter, supra note 13, at 616; see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, EMERGING HEALTH 
CARE ISSUES: FOLLOW-ON BIOLOGIC DRUG COMPETITION v–vii (2009), available at 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/emerging-health-care-issues-follo 
w-biologic-drug-competition-federal-trade-commission-report/p083901biologicsreport.pdf, 
archived at http://perma.cc/HG4Q-6FD3 (“The economic model put forth by pioneer drug 
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the purpose of the twelve-year market exclusivity for biologics developers was 
that only such a long period of market exclusivity would provide developers of 
original biologics with sufficient incentive to innovate in new biologics.232  
The BPCIA RCS regime, and, especially, the twelve-year market 
exclusivity RCS, have been the subject of much critique.233 Many have 
expressed concern that BPCIA fails to strike a balance between competition 
and innovation and that its RCS regime (and the twelve-year market 
exclusivity period in particular) creates windfalls to biologics developers and 
would make it very difficult or even unfeasible for generic competition to 
enter the biologics market.234 However, it is still too early to determine 
whether the BPCIA RCS regime successfully realized its goal of opening the 
biologics market to generic competition while maintaining sufficient 
incentives for innovation.235 
                                                                                                                     
manufacturers to justify [a 12 to 14-year exclusivity period] is based on the average time 
required to recoup the investment to develop and commercialize a typical biologic drug.”); 
Henry Grabowski, Data Exclusivity for Biologics: What Is the Appropriate Period of 
Protection?, 10 AM. ENTERPRISE INST. FOR PUB. POL’Y RES. HEALTH POL’Y OUTLOOK, 
Sept. 2009, at 4–5, available at http://www.aei.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/10-HPO-
Grabowski-Sep08-g.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/Y6AR-CD6C (“The average [product] 
exclusivity period for small molecule drugs in the United States is approximately twelve 
years.”).  
 232 See Safe and Affordable Biotech Drugs: The Need for a Generic Pathway: Hearing 
Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Gov’t Reform, 110th Cong. 161–76 (2007) 
(statement of Henry Grabowski); Kathleen R. Kelleher, FDA Approval of Generic 
Biologics: Finding a Regulatory Pathway, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 245, 256 
(2007) (“Some have suggested that a 12-year [product] exclusivity for pioneer biologics 
would be optimal because traditional drugs generally have slightly under 12 years of 
[product] exclusivity due to patent protection.”); Jeremiah J. Kelly & Michael David, No 
Longer “If,” but “When”: The Coming Abbreviated Approval Pathway for Follow-On 
Biologics, 64 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 115, 139–40 (2009) (“A 12 to 14 year period of innovator 
exclusivity is not arbitrary; studies have shown that the point at which an innovator 
biological drug becomes profitable (the ‘break-even’ point) is between 12.9 and 16.2 
years.”). 
 233 See McMahon, supra note 67, at 680–81 (arguing that BPCIA, as enacted, reflects 
what he describes as legislative imprudence). 
 234 See Biologics and Biosimilars: Balancing Incentives for Innovation: Hearing 
Before the H. Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 111th Cong. 17 n.3 (2009) (statement of Bruce A. Leicher); Brill, supra note 26, 
at 7, 8 & 11; Kotlikoff, supra note 165, at 6 (arguing that granting developers of original 
biologics exclusivity periods of twelve to fifteen years would create overly long monopoly 
periods that would distort the economy of pharmaceuticals and calling for limiting 
exclusivity periods in biologics to lengths such as those granted under the Hatch-Waxman 
Act); McMahon supra note 67, at 671–75 (arguing that the generic exclusivity under 
BPCIA is worthless and therefore illusory). 
 235 As of January 2015, the FDA has not approved any biosimilar version of any 
reference product. On January 7, 2015, the FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee 
(ODAC) voted in favor of recommending the approval for marketing of its follow-on 
filgrastim. See Media Release, Novartis Global, Sandoz Biosimilar Filgrastim 
Recommended for Approval by FDA Oncologic Drugs Advisory Committee (Jan. 7, 
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H. Regulatory Competitive Shelters in New Antibiotics 
On July 9, 2012, as part of the Food and Drug Administration Safety and 
Innovation Act (FDASIA), President Obama signed into law the Generating 
Antibiotic Incentives Now (GAIN) Act.236 Under the GAIN Act, once a drug 
has been designated as a “qualified infectious disease product,”237 any and all 
exclusivities applicable to that drug under the Hatch-Waxman Act and Orphan 
Drug Act are to be extended by five years.238 Thus, for example, if a drug 
product contains an active pharmaceutical ingredient (API) that is considered a 
new chemical entity under the Hatch-Waxman Act, and the API is also, 
possibly later, recognized as a “qualified infectious disease product” under 
FDASIA, the FDA may not accept applications for generic versions of this 
product for a period of ten years from the original date of approval—five years 
for the original NCE exclusivity239 and another five years under FDASIA. 
Similarly, if the new product is approved by the FDA for the treatment of a 
rare disease under the Orphan Drug Act, then the seven-year exclusivity under 
the Act is extended by another five years under FDASIA for a total of twelve 
years of market exclusivity.240 The purpose of the GAIN Act’s RCS was to 
provide additional incentives for the development of anti-bacterial products in 
light of an existing and ongoing unmet public need for antibiotic products to 
fight serious bacterial infections that are resistant to existing antibiotics.241  
                                                                                                                     
2015), www.novartis.com/newsroom/media-releases/en/2015/1885139.shtml, archived at 
http://perma.cc/2B2U-M7G2. If approved, Sandoz’s filgrastim will be the first biosimilar 
product in the United States.  
 236 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 
§§ 801–06, 126 Stat. 993, 1077–82 (2012) (codified in scattered sections of 21 U.S.C.).  
 237 A “qualified infectious disease” product is defined as “an antibacterial or antifungal 
drug for human use intended to treat serious or life-threatening infections, including those 
caused by an antibacterial or antifungal resistant pathogen, including novel or emerging 
infectious pathogens or any other qualifying pathogens” as decided by the Secretary based 
on a weighing of considerations enumerated in FDASIA and consultation with relevant 
experts and agencies. See id. §§ 801(f)–(g).  
 238 Id. §§ 801(a)–(b); see also supra Parts III.A–B. Notably, the GAIN Act RCS 
regime is different from proposals for transferable intellectual property rights (TIPRs) in 
that the five-year RCS is not transferable to products other than the antibiotic developed. In 
that respect, the GAIN Act RCS might suffer from shortcomings similar to those raised by 
regular patent rights in the context of antibiotic pharmaceuticals. See supra Aaron S. 
Kesselheim & Kevin Outterson, Improving Antibiotic Markets for Long Term 
Sustainability, 11 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y L. & ETHICS 101, 132–33 (2011); Parts III.B–C. 
On the other hand, the five-year RCS instituted under the GAIN Act is much longer than 
the six to twenty-four months proposed as a recommended period for TIPRs. Kesselheim & 
Outterson, supra, tbl. 2, at 148.  
 239 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.  
 240 See supra note 146 and accompanying text.  
 241 See H.R. REP. NO. 112-495, at 34 (2012); 158 CONG. REC. S4625 (2012) (statement 
of Sen. Menendez).  
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It is still much too early to evaluate the effectiveness and success of the 
GAIN Act RCS regime. Yet it is worth mentioning that, like the pediatric 
exclusivity, the GAIN Act includes an inherent process for the reassessment of 
the incentives afforded under the Act, to be initiated five years from its 
enactment.242  
As is the case with most RCS regimes, the legislative history of the GAIN 
Act includes no discussion of the actual length of the RCS or an indication as 
to why five years was chosen as the proper length for this RCS, rather than 
three or seven years, for example. Nonetheless, the GAIN Act RCS regime 
reflects sophistication in the use of RCSs as an instrument of innovation 
policy.243 
IV. WHY ARE REGULATORY COMPETITIVE SHELTERS, AS A 
PHENOMENON, LIMITED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY TO FDA REGULATION?  
The fact that seven of the eight RCS regimes discussed earlier are 
administered by the FDA, and only one by a different agency, raises questions 
regarding the general applicability of RCSs (or, at the very least, innovation-
incentivizing RCSs).244 Namely, are RCSs only suitable for use in the context 
of chemical and biomedical arts? Can RCS regimes be successfully 
implemented outside of the FDA, or are RCSs, by virtue of being tailored to 
create incentives for certain industries, expected to be limited almost 
exclusively to FDA regulation?  
There does not seem to be anything unique about RCSs that renders them 
exclusively suited for only certain areas of technology. Further, on their face, 
there does not appear to be anything in the specific areas of technology subject 
to RCS regimes that makes them uniquely suitable for RCSs.  
The prevalence of RCSs in regulatory frameworks administered by the 
FDA may, however, be at least partly attributable to the increased value that 
our society places on public health and on safety of biomedical products, and 
the belief that clinical trials of new products (which FDA RCSs are meant to 
incentivize) advance these goals.245 Another way of looking at this explanation 
                                                                                                                     
 242 Food and Drug Administration Safety and Innovation Act, Pub. L. No. 112-144, 
§ 805, 126 Stat. 993, 1080–81 (2012) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 360a (2012)).  
 243 This may be testament not only to the many beneficial qualities of RCSs as a policy 
tool but also to the GAIN Act drafters’ ability to use these qualities in a skillful manner. 
 244 Notably, another significant RCS regime that was recently proposed but has not 
been enacted was also meant to be administered by the FDA. See Modernizing Our Drug & 
Diagnostics Evaluation and Regulatory Network Cures Act of 2011 (MODDERN Cures 
Act), H.R. 3497, 112th Cong. (2011) (proposing an extension of the RCSs under the ODA, 
Hatch-Waxman Act, and BPCIA by an additional six to twelve months for the 
development of diagnostics for the treated condition and a new fifteen-year market 
exclusivity for pharmaceuticals approved for use in “dormant therapies”). 
 245 See Eisenberg 2007, supra note 15, at 372–73 (“We value health, and we believe 
that high quality biomedical science will have public health payoffs. FDA regulation 
similarly promotes . . . the conduct of scientifically rigorous clinical trials of drugs.”).  
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is that the relatively high financial burden imposed under FDA law on 
technology developers may require additional incentives beyond those 
afforded under patent law to undertake the financial risks associated with drug 
development. In this regard, FDA regulation may be “fertile soil” for RCS 
regimes because of the high costs of technological innovation imposed under 
FDA law and the high stakes involved in such endeavors.246  
The fact that existing RCS regimes are almost exclusive to FDA law could 
also be attributed to the success of the ODA and Hatch-Waxman RCS regimes 
that made RCSs “visible” as a public policy tool for drafters of legislation who 
tend to concentrate their efforts on pharmaceutical and biomedical 
technologies.247 It may also be that RCSs’ many advantages over patents have 
made them popular with FDA constituents—primarily the pharmaceutical and 
biotechnology industries—which tend to rely heavily on patents as a critical 
element in their business models and therefore spend vast amounts of money 
lobbying for such regimes. Further, the expertise acquired by the FDA over the 
years in evaluation of products as well as in the administration of RCS regimes 
may have served to make it an attractive candidate to administer more and 
more such regimes. It is quite possible that all of the above play at least some 
role in the prevalence of RCSs in FDA legislation.  
Regardless, nothing in these explanations seems to reflect negatively on 
the prospects of success of RCS regimes in other areas of technology regulated 
by different administrative agencies. Indeed, there do not seem to be any 
objective impediments to the institution of RCS regimes in other areas of 
technology, which may include, for example, genetically modified food crops 
(regulated by the EPA), safety features for cars (regulated by the National 
Highway Traffic Safety Authority), new medical research tools (not currently 
regulated, but could be regulated by the National Institutes of Health), novel 
synthetic food technologies like in-vitro meat (regulated by the FDA), and 
more. 
V. CONCLUSION 
Regulatory competitive shelters are competitive advantages resulting from 
statutory bars on regulatory action where such action is otherwise mandated 
and would have taken place but for the triggering of the bars. The RCSs 
discussed in this Article are not and ought not be viewed as an array of 
separate exclusivity regimes, but rather as a single regulatory phenomenon 
whose members share several defining characteristics, including: (1) a 
common purpose of creating incentive for technological innovation, (2) 
limitation in time, (3) automatic onset upon the fulfillment of certain 
                                                                                                                     
 246 High regulatory costs alone, however, are not unique to the context of FDA 
regulation and, thus, cannot provide full explanation to the aggregate of RCS regimes in 
FDA law.  
 247 Rep. Henry Waxman, for example, has been involved in the drafting and promotion 
of many RCS regimes.  
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legislative, or regulatory requirements without a need for an affirmative grant, 
and (4) the lack of conferral of any identifiable right such that the benefits of 
RCSs are incidental and “automatically enforced” by the administering 
agency. Some additional features shared by most RCSs are their (5) low 
susceptibility to legal challenges, (6) high level of specificity to particular 
circumstances, (7) flexibility as a public policy tool, (8) highly clear 
boundaries leading to legal certainty, (9) low risk of imposing impediments on 
subsequent R&D, and (10) low administrative cost.  
The mechanism by which the RCSs discussed herein achieve their goal, as 
explained in this Article—whether market exclusivity, data exclusivity or 
generic exclusivity—is not as straightforward as that of other government 
benefits, but is mostly highly effective. As a result, since their emergence in 
the late 1970s, RCSs have become increasingly prevalent in the context of 
regulated technologies, primarily (but not necessarily exclusive to) 
pharmaceuticals, where their many advantages, especially over patents, have 
made them popular among industry stakeholders. Of the eight RCS regimes 
and fifteen RCSs reviewed in this Article, seven regimes and fourteen RCSs 
are administered by the FDA in the context of biomedical technologies. 
However, there seems to be no objective impediment to the institution and 
implementation of RCS frameworks in the context of other technologies, 
including ones not regulated by the FDA. Rather, the advantages of RCSs 
make them an attractive public policy tool in other areas of regulated 
technology where there is a need to create incentives for technological 
innovation and disclosure of pertinent information thereof.  
Yet, their relative novelty as a regulatory phenomenon makes certain 
aspects of RCSs insufficiently clear and requires further research, including 
(1) RCSs’ cost-efficiency and effectiveness in achieving their goals as opposed 
to other alternatives, (2) their potential to serve as an alternative to patents, (3) 
how to minimize the risk of anticompetitive abuses of RCSs, (4) the 
development of a methodology for reason-based determination of appropriate 
length for specific RCSs,248 and (5) what other areas may be suitable for the 
institution of RCS regimes and what criteria should be employed in making 
such determinations. Other interesting issues that may merit further inquiry 
include the ability of RCS-beneficiaries to transfer and extinguish their RCSs, 
the possible classification of RCSs (and especially iiRCSs)249 as property or 
intellectual property, and RCSs’ status under the Constitution’s Progress 
Clause.250 
                                                                                                                     
 248 Efforts in this regard may be informed by important recent work by Budish, Roin 
and Williams. See Eric Budish, Benjamin N. Roin & Heidi Williams, Do Fixed Patent 
Terms Distort Innovation? Evidence from Cancer Clinical Trials 35 (Initiative on Global 
Markets, Working Paper No. 97, 2013) (proposing parameters and consideration for 
determination of optimal differential patent terms; indicating that FDA RCSs provide such 
differential patent terms in the context of pharmaceuticals).  
 249 See supra note 3.  
 250 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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While the “golden age” of RCSs was the 1980s, renewed popularity of 
RCSs in federal regulatory regimes (both legislated and proposed) over the last 
few years may indicate that we should expect to see more of them in future 
legislation. It is therefore necessary to start discussing RCSs per se, outside of 
and beyond the context of particular regimes so that we may derive their full 
benefits and avoid their perils.  
 
 
 
